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THE PRIVATE IS PUBLIC: THE RELEVANCE
OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN DEFINING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
SAM KAM IN*
Abstract: Because the Fourth Amendment regulates only governmental
conduct, the behavior of private actors is almost wholly absent from
academic Fourth Amendment literature. This Article argues that this
exclusive focus on official conduct is myopic. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court often looks to the conduct of private actors to determine the scope
of permissible government conduct, a Fourth Amendment approach that
ignores the invasions engaged in by these private actors is likely to concede
questions regarding important civil liberties before the government even
acts. This Article traces the development of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence, explaining the origins of the Court's current focus on private
conduct. It then describes the current state of private intrusions upon
privacy, arguing that emerging technologies have facilitated an expo-
nential growth in the capacity of private actors to obtain and process
private information. This expansion in private searching will likely lead
courts to uphold similar invasions of privacy when government agents
engage in the same kind of conduct. Finally, this Article proposes legal,
legislative, and practical solutions to the current privacy crisis, and
reluctantly concludes that only individual, practical steps are likely to
produce effective privacy expansions in the near term.
INTRODUCTION
In early 2004, the U.S. Justice Department made headlines and
inflamed privacy groups when it subpoenaed medical records from a
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number of abortion providers around the country.' The Bush admini-
stration claimed that the records were necessary to defend legal chal-
lenges to the late-term abortion ban that was signed into law the previ-
ous year.2
 A federal judge disagreed, however, and granted a Chicago
hospital's motion to quash the subpoenas. 3 Undaunted, the Justice
Department continues to press its subpoenas in several other states.4
The Bush administration's attempt to force the release of private
medical records is only one in a series of high-profile actions that have
drawn the ire of privacy groups. For example, in late 2002, the ad-
ministration announced its plans for Total Information Awareness, a
federal program that would combine information from public and
private records to create a macro database of individually identifiable
information.5 Although negative publicity forced the administration
to curtail its plans for Total Information Awareness, 6 there is evidence
that the administration is still pursuing many of the program's goals
by other means.?
Although these high-profile governmental attempts to obtain pri-
vate information have rightly made headlines, I argue that a possibly
greater threat to privacy has been largely ignored—the actions of pri-
vate actors in gaining access to information to which they historically
lacked access. In this Article, I argue that the focus on state actors—by
the media, by scholars, and by interest groups—is myopic and ill-
serves the interests of privacy. My thesis in this Article is that this ex-
Erich Lichtblau, Ashcroft Defends Subpoenas, NY, TIMES, Feb. 13, 2004, at A27.
2 Nat'l Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079, at *1 (N.D. III. Feb. 6,
2004).
3 See id.
4 U.S. Seeks Late-Term Abortion Records, L.A. Tuns, Feb. 13. 2004, at A31.
John Markoff, Pentagon Plans a Computer System That Would Peer at Personal Data of
Americans, N.Y. Ttta Es, Nov. 9. 2002, at Al2.
6 See Adam Clymer, Senate Rejects Pentagon Plan to Mine Citizens' Personal Data for Clues to
Terrorism., N.Y. Timm Jan. 24, 2003, at Al2.
7 An editorial published in the San Francisco Chronicle in 2004, claimed the following:
When retired Adm. John Poindexter left government service last year, it
was widely believed that his misguided scheme to collect private data an U.S.
citizens was gone for good, too. It was a bad assumption, The Poindexter-
inspired drive to electronically surveil and compile dossiers on millions of
Americans is apparently still in gear.
Editorial, Data Mining Schemes, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 27, 2004, at A26, 2004 WLNR 7625556; see
Michael Sniffer', Controversial Data-Mining Project Lives On, CMI) TEctiWus, Feb. 23, 2004,
(claiming that It] he government is still financing research to create powerful tools that
could mine millions of public and private records for information about terrorists despite
an uproar last year over fears it might ensnare innocent Americans"), hup://information
week.com/story/showArticlejh tnil?articlelD= 18100004 (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
20041	 Private Ad10,3 in Defining the Fourth Amendment 	 85
elusive focus on state action ignores the fact that, as it is currently in-
terpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment's cov-
erage depends crucially on the scope of private actors' conduct. 8
This is true not because private action is subject to the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment; it is not. 9 Rather, private conduct is
crucial because courts will examine that conduct to determine
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an
area that a government actor has invaded. 19 If an individual has al-
lowed private actors access to that area, she generally will not be per-
mitted lo complain that her rights have been violated when the gov-
ernment seeks access to that area as well." Thus, the consistent failure
8 See infra notes 59-149 and accompanying text.
9 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (stating that
"the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an arbitrary one, ef-
fected by a private party on his own initiative"); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475
(1921) (finding that the Fourth Amendment's "origin and history clearly show that it was
intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies").
Private actors whose conduct is so intertwined with that of state law enforcement
authorities that they may be considered state actors are the exception to this rule. See Jack-
son v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (holding that, in general, the Constitu-
tion does not purport to govern private conduct, and that the behavior of private individu-
als will not be attributed to the state unless there is a "sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may
be fairly treated as that of the State itself"); Erwin Chetnerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80
Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 508 (1985) (arguing that "[p]rivate behavior need comply with the
Constitution only if the state is so intimately involved in the conduct—that is, if the nexus
to the state is so great—that the state can be held responsible for the activity"). Professor
Paul Brest provided the following explanation:
The state action doctrine originated in the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Su-
preme Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not authorize Con-
gress to prohibit discrimination by privately owned inns, conveyances, and
places of amusement; rather, its purpose was to "provide modes of redress
against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers executive or
judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the
amend men t."
See Paul Brest, Stale Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 1296, 1300 (1982) (quoting the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 {1883) (cita-
tion omitted)).
10 Throughout, 1 use the word "area" to describe the thing being searched. I mean to
include within this phrase those intangible places and things in which one might reasona-
bly wish to maintain an expectation of privacy—e-mails, conversations, medical records—
as well as tangible areas such as cars, houses, and offices. Of course, as I discuss below, the
idea that tangible and intangible things or places are afforded the same protection is a
relatively new idea. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928); infra
notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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of scholars and privacy advocates to examine the role of private con-
duct in defining the Fourth Amendment has the effect of ceding the
legal battle for protection from government intrusion before that in-
trusion has even taken place.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, in Part I, I trace the de-
velopment of the Supreme Court's current understanding of the
Fourth Amendment. 12 I follow the Court's jurisprudence from one
based on a strict, historical reading of the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment to an interpretation based on the concept of reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy. This latter test, developed in 1967, in Katz u United
States," remains the fundamental Fourth Amendment paradigm today.
Next, in Part II, I discuss how the Katz standard has been applied
in recent years." I demonstrate that in determining whether or not a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists when the government invades
an area in which a defendant's asserts a right to privacy, courts pay
particular attention to whether a private actor could have done what
the government in fact did. If the answer to that question is yes,
courts generally find no reasonable expectation of privacy, and hence,
no Fourth Amendment protections. I will show that the Court's doc-
trine now focuses on the practical capacity of other actors to invade a
defendant's privacy rather than on the legality of that conduct; even if
government actors are acting in a way that could be punished if done
by a private actor, courts will find no reasonable expectation of privacy
if such an illegal invasion by a private actor was foreseeable.
In Part III, I show how recent technological innovations have
made courts' focus on private conduct particularly troubling for those
concerned about the reach of government surveillance.i° As technolo-
gies make it easier for employers, insurers, and even simple snoops to
gain access to previously private areas, members of the public have, to
a large extent, taken for granted the fact that many eyes are watching
them. Those who accept this private snooping may not realize, how-
ever, that by permitting these prying eyes to investigate them, they
have essentially consented to government surveillance as well.
12 See infra notes 19-58 and accompanying text.
15 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
14 See infra notes 59-149 and accompanying text.
16 Fourth Amendment claims can be raised either by defendants seeking the exclusion
of evidence in a criminal trial or by plaintiffs alleging a violation of their rights. For silo-.
plicity, 1 refer generically throughout to the Fourth Amendment claimant as a defendant.
16 See infra notes 150-242 and accompanying text.
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Finally, Part IV looks to the future." I argue that the current
scope of the Fourth Amendment is unlikely to change in the near
term. If anything, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kyllo v.
United States is the apotheosis of the focus on private conduct to
define the contours of the Fourth Amendment." Similarly, I argue
that laws designed to protect individuals from one another are un-
likely to be useful in protecting individuals from their government.
Because the courts have refused to find consistently that conduct by a
government official that would contravene a civil statute violates an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy per se, such statutes are
perhaps worse than useless in regulating government conduct. Be-
cause these statutes can give individuals the false sense that their pri-
vacy is protected, they may have the effect of providing less protec-
tion, rather than more, against governmental invasions of privacy. I
argue instead that the only way for individuals to gain protection
against governmental intrusions into their privacy is to actively seek to
protect their private inforMation from all prying eyes, public and pri-
vate.
I. THE MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. The Text
Although a general right to privacy has been read into a number
of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights," the privacy rights of the peo-
ple vis-à-vis the government are protected most fundamentally by the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 20 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
17 See infra notes 253-279 and accompanying text.
18 See 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
19 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy
in the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution).
2° Various provisions of the Fourth Amendment have been incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law, making it applicable to the states as
well as the federal government. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (enforc-
ing the exclusionary rule against the states).
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 23
The Amendment is generally interpreted as containing two clauses:
one speaking to unreasonable searches and seizures, and the other
discussing the requirements for the issuance of warrants. The rela-
tionship between these two clauses is murky at best and has been the
topic of much controversy in the two-hundred-plus years since their
drafting. 22
 Faced with an essentially inscrutable text, the U.S. Supreme
Court has generated a number of interpretive rules that find varying
degrees of support in the text of the Amendment—the Amendment
expresses a strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to ju-
dicially approved warrants; 23
 all searches, whether subject to the war-
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22 See, e.g., NELSON II. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF 111E FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 100-03 (1937). Nelson 8. Lasson
writes that the confusion regarding the two clauses is essentially a result of misreporting by
one of the drafters. Id. at 101-02. He notes that the House of Representatives originally
approved a draft of what would become the Fourth Amendment that read,
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their houses, their
papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized.
Id. at 100 n.77 (emphasis added). Although the relationship between the two clauses is
relatively straightforward in this draft, the House's Reporting Committee reported that the
House approved the version with which we are now familiar, which contained amendments
the House had in fact rejected. Id. at 101. But see Thomas' Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 Mien. L. Rev. 547, 718-19 (1999) (arguing that the evidence that the
current version of the Fourth Amendment is not the one that was approved by the House
of Representatives is Inconsistent").
23 For example, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court stated the following:
It is accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or seizure carried
out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless
the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of excep-
tions based on the presence of "exigent circumstances."
403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971). Exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements
include the following:
tlinvestigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid ar-
rest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches,
vehicle searches, container searches, inventory searches, border searches,
searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special
needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant require-
ments impracticable.
Theodore P. Metzler et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. U. 1084, 1084 (2001).
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rant requirement or not, must generally be supported by probable
cause;24 and the ultimate constitutional test for every search is reason-
ableness.25 Although each of these interpretations is now taken more
or less as orthodoxy, these heuristics are inherently inconsistent, and
none of them is entirely free from controversy. 26
Thus, at its most fundamental levels—the relationship between
the Amendment's two clauses and the degree of suspicion that must
be shown before a warrantless search may be conducted—it becomes
clear that the Fourth Amendment is hardly self-defining. These prob-
lems of construction are compounded by the fact that at the time of
the Amendment's drafting, conceptions of privacy, crime, and polic-
ing were fundamentally different than they are today. For example,
there were no organized police forces during the founding period.
Rather, law enforcement was handled exclusively by part-timers and
amateurs.27 Although crime as we know it today clearly existed in co-
24 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (stating that "[i]n enforcing
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable
search permitted by the Constitution"). But see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 624 (1989) (permitting alcohol and drug testing after railway accidents even in
the absence of individualized suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (permit-
ting brief detentions for investigative purposes based upon the lesser standard of reason-
able suspicion).
25 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (Scalia, .1.) (ex-
plaining that "la]s the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of
the constitutionality of a governmental search is 'reasonableness'").
22 See. e.g., AKIIIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTIIIITION AND CRIMINAL. PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINcunts 10-17 (1997) (arguing that the Founders were deeply skeptical of judicially-
issued warrants and that the Fourth Amendment should be read as mandating that all
searches be reasonable rather than as expressing a preference for warranted searches); see
also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757, 761
(1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court has misconstrued not only the relationship between
the Fourth Amendment's two clauses, but Also two other pillars of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence—the requirement of probable cause for all searches and the application of the
exclusionary rule to all Fourth Amendment violations); Davies, supra note 22, at 591 (argu-
ing that a general reasonableness test would have been unimaginable to the Founders).
27 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Hmtv. REV. 820,
830-32 (1994). Professor Carol S. Steiker stated the following:
Our twentieth-century police and even our contemporary sense of "polic-
ing" would be utterly foreign to our colonial forebears. Law enforcement in
colonial times was, as legal historian Lawrence Friedman tells us, "a business
of amateurs." Public order was maintained by a loose system of sheriffs, con-
stables, and night watchmen. Most counties had a sheriff, appointed by the
governor of the colony as the chief law enforcement officer, in charge not
only of jails and prisoners, but of jury selection as well. But sheriffs had no
professional law enforcement staffs under their direction. Instead, ordinary
citizens who were employed in other trades or professions as their means of
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Ionial times, the physical fear of crime as a social phenomenon and as
a political issue simply did not. Today, the primary conundrum of
crime in the United States is generally seen as the importance of pro-
tecting the public from predation while protecting individuals from
the invasive power of the state. 28
 By contrast, crime in colonial times
was feared not so much as a threat to individual safety, but as a threat
to the moral and social order. 29
 Furthermore, the main privacy con-
livelihood took turns serving as constables during the day or watchmen dur-
ing the night. The constabulary "carried the main burden of law enforce-
ment," as its members were required to patrol during the day as well as super-
vise the night watch. Serving as a constable was an unpopular task, however,
and many towns had difficulty maintaining an adequate presence. The con-
stables generally served without training, uniforms, weapons, or other accou-
trements of modern law enforcement officers. They ordinarily did not receive
stipends, but were sometimes compensated by private individuals for the re-
turn of stolen property. The night watch was equally amateurish: early at-
tempts to have a paid watch in New York and Boston ultimately failed because
it was so expensive; thus, the watch was generally staffed by requiring all citi-
zens to take a turn "in the duty of watch and ward."
The constabulary and the watch differed from modern law enforcement
structures not only in personnel, but in function; their duties often strayed
quite far from our modern notions of peacekeeping and investigation. For
example, one of the earliest colonial constables had duties that included an-
nouncing marriages approved by civil authority and serving as "Sealer of
Weights and Measures" and "Surveyor of Land." Urban constables were gen-
erally charged with monitoring the condition of "streets, sidewalks, privies,
[and' slaughterhouses." The night watchmen usually were required to call
out the hour and the weather; sometimes they were entrusted with the care of
street lamps as well. Indeed, it was not until well into the nineteenth century
that some urban authorities declared that it had "become necessary that in
every large town there should be several intelligent and experienced men de-
voting their time and skill to the pursuit and arrest of ... robbers, house-
breakers, pickpockets, and other felons.' The duties of constables and night
watchmen never developed into the job of investigative "policing' with which
modern law enforcement agencies are charged.
Id. (citations omitted).
28 See generally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. ItEv. I
(1964) (arguing that two contrasting views of the criminal justice system inevitably com-
pete—one based on crime control, efficiency and finality, the other on providing due pro-
cess and individualized consideration).
29 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
34 (1993). Professor Lawrence M. Friedman stated the following:
Since crimes were sins, and sins crime, there was no sharp line between
"victimless crimes" and crimes of predation or violence. The idea of a victim-
less crime is distinctly modern. An offense against God was an offense against
society, and a positive threat to the social order. When Sodom and Gomorrah
flouted God's will, his anger laid them waste.
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,tern of the Founders generally was not searches by police officers in
pursuit of criminal prosecutions, but rather wide-ranging and unfet-
tered searches by customs and tax inspectors or by officials of the
Crown looking for materials deemed seditious." In fact., during the
founding period, Fourth Amendment claims were rarely even raised
in the criminal context. At that time, the legality of a search usually
was contested as a defense to a civil trespass action rather than in the
course of a criminal prosecution. 31 One primary reason for this, of
course, is the fact that the exclusionary rule is entirely an invention of
the twentieth century;" it likely would have come as a surprise to the
Founders that otherwise competent. evidence would not be admitted
in court because of the means by which it was obtained.
Thus, even if the text of the Fourth Amendment were clear in its
terms (and it is not), applying in contemporary times a document
Id. Thus, according to Professor Friedman, crime was a threat not simply to its direct vic-
tims but to both the perpetrators and to society as a whole. See id.
3° See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J.
393, 394 (1995). WilliarnJ. Stuntz stated the following:
Privacy protection in the past had little to do with ordinary criminal proce-
dure. The Fourth and Fifth Amendments arose out of heresy investigations
and seditious libel cases, not murders and robberies. In the late nineteenth
century, when the Supreme Court first took a hand in crafting Fourth and
Fifth Amendment law, the key cases involved railroad regulation and anti-
trust—again, a far cry from ordinary criminal litigation. In both the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, the law's primary effect seems to have been
to make it harder to prosecute objectionable crimes—heresy, sedition, or un-
popular trade offenses in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, regula-
tory offenses in the late nineteenth century. To a surprising degree, the his-
tory of criminal procedure is not really about procedure at all but about
substantive issues, about what conduct the government should and should
not be able to punish.
Id. Similarly, Nelson B. Lasso]] cites as the main impetus for the protections of the Fourth
Amendment, and its state analogues, a number of cases, both from the colonies and Eng-
land, involving the enforcement of unpopular tax and sedition laws. LAssoN, supra note
22, at 42-78.
31
 See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (KB. 1765) (rejecting the de-
fense of agents of the Crown in a trespass action on the ground that the search they con-
ducted left too much discretion to those charged with its execution); Wilkes v. Wood, 98
Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (K.B. 1763) (finding that a general warrant is insufficient to permit
an entry into plaintiff's home).
32 See, e.g., Map, 367 U.S. at 648 (stating that "in the Weeks case, this Court `for the
first time' held that 'in a federal prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of
evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure'") (quoting Wolf s Colorado, 338
U.S. 25, 28 (1949)); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing for the
first time that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the rights guaranteed in the
Fourth Amendment).
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written in a very different context and addressing very different con-
cerns is a task necessarily requiring a certain amount of inventiveness
on the part of jurists." For example, how is one to determine, parsing
the fifty-four words of the Amendment, whether or not police officers
may conduct a warrantless search of a paper bag contained in the
trunk of a suspicious automobile, 34
 whether federal officers may "mas-
sage" a duffle bag in the luggage compartment of a bus," or whether
law enforcement officials may fly over private property in a borrowed
aircraft to peer through the semi-opaque roof of a shed? 36 The short
answer, of course, is that neither the text of the Amendment nor
founding-era understandings of its meaning are likely to provide con-
sistent answers to these questions. Rather, judges must turn elsewhere
to determine the scope of the Amendment's protections in contem-
porary society. It is to these alternative means of interpreting the
Fourth Amendment that I now turn.
B. Interpreting the Text
An early example of the hermeneutic difficulties posed by the
Fourth Amendment is presented by the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United
States.37 In Olmstead, the government tapped the defendant's office
telephone in a way that constituted no trespass upon his property."
The connections were all made either in the common basement of an
33
 Of course, all of the Constitution's provisions are applied in a context unimaginable
to the Founders. One could argue, for example, that one of the problems in interpreting
the Commerce Clause today is the way interstate and foreign commerce has changed since
1789. Sec generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of interpreting the Com-
merce Clause in a modern age). The Founders were aware, however, of interstate and for-
eign commerce in a way in which they simply were not familiar with the modern concep-
tions of crime and law enforcement.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798. 820-22 (1982) (finding that when police
officers have probable cause to believe that contraband may be found in a car's trunk, they
may search any closed containers within the trunk that might contain the contraband).
33 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (finding that the physi-
cal manipulation of carry-on baggage in an overhead compartment was a search for pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment).
33 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding
that because the officers were in Federal Aviation Administration approved air space, they
were only doing what a member of the public could have done, and the defendant had
thus assumed the risk that his illegal crop would be d iscovered).
37 See 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
38 Id. at 457.
2004]	 Private Actrms in Defining the Fourth Amendment	 93
apartment building or on public wires." Based on conversations
overheard via the wiretap, the officers obtained enough information
to prosecute defendant Roy Olmstead and obtain a conviction. 40 Olm-
stead appealed, arguing as he had at trial that the tapping of his
phone was a search, and that because the search was conducted with-
out a warrant, it was presumptively unconstitutional and its fruits must
be suppressed. 41
Relying on a literal reading of the text of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the government argued that the Constitution simply was not
implicated when the government eavesdropped on the defendant's
phone calls. The Supreme Court agreed:
The [Fourth] Amendment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things—the person, the house, his papers or
his effects. The description, of the warrant necessary to make
the proceeding lawful, is that it must specify the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
„ The Amendment does not forbid what was done here.
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.
There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defen-
dants.42
The Court arrived at this conclusion by means of a very close reading
of the text of the Amendment. An electronic interception of a conver-
sation fails to qualify as a search both because of the area searched and
the method used. The thing "searched" is—unlike persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects—intangible. When the Constitution speaks of the
things that are protected from unreasonable search and seizure, it
speaks of substantial things on which hands can be laid. Similarly, the
method used by law enforcement—listening remotely by wire—is nei-
ther a search nor a seizure because it does not involve the physical tak-
°° Id. As we have seen, the absence of a physical trespass on the defendant's property
historically was viewed as critically important, given the historical link that existed between
the Fourth Amendment and property rights. Sec supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
As we shall see, however, in the latter half of the twentieth century, courts have moved
away from a property-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See infra notes 132-143
and accompanying text.
4°
 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455.
See id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 964.
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ing, touching, and inspecting that the text of the Amendment ap-
peared to envision.
As a reading of a text, this interpretation of the Fourth Amend-
ment is almost entirely unassailable. In fact, the concept of either
searching or seizing a conversation is one that strains any ordinary un-
derstanding of those words. As an attempt to understand the text in
context, however—to recover the spirit behind the text—the Olmstead
reading is somewhat cramped. 43
 To the extent that the Fourth
Amendment was written to be a check on the capacity of law enforce-
ment. officials to conduct broad, invasive investigations based on little
or no suspicion, the Olmstead Court's reading does the Amendment
little justice. So long as law enforcement officials snoop by means not
imagined by the Founders or investigate areas not explicitly mentioned
in the Amendment's text, it would seem their actions will not offend
the Constitution. Nonetheless, it would be thirty-eight years before the
Court abandoned this narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment.
C. Katz v. United States—A Paradigm Shift
In 1967, the Supreme Court's decision in Katz v. United States"
established a new approach to the question of when a government
investigation becomes a search, an approach that remains critical to
understanding the Fourth Amendment today. In Katz, the Court dealt
again with government wiretapping, this time of a public phone
booth by federal agents anxious to show that defendant Charles Katz
was using the phone booth to make book on sporting events. 45
 The
wiretap was achieved by placing a recording device on the outside of
the booth and activating it only when Katz was seen entering the
booth.46
 Katz's phone calls were recorded, thus allowing the govern-
ment to obtain enough evidence to secure a conviction for violation
of the federal bookmaking statutes. 47
On appeal from this conviction, Katz argued that the telephone
booth was an area entitled to Fourth Amendment protections." The
43 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Fetch Some Soupmeat, 16 CARnozo L RE v. 2209, 2218 n.43
(1995) (citing articles and arguing that "[m]ost theorizing about statutory interpretation
since 1982 has emphasized the ways in which statutes evolve").
14 See 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
" Id. at 348.
413 See id. at 348-49.
47 Id. at 348.
48 Id. at 349.
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government, relying on Olmstead, argued to the contrary—because no
physical search or seizure was made and because no tangible thing
was searched or seized, the Fourth Amendment simply was not impli-
cated by placing a listening device on top of the phone booth 49
In a decisive shift from Olmstead, the Court agreed with the de-
fendant that the Fourth Amendment was implicated when the tele-
phone booth was tapped. 5° But the Court went beyond merely holding
that an intangible search can implicate the Fourth Amendment in the
same way that a tangible search can; rather, it fundamentally changed
the way in which the Amendment's protections are conceived:
Because of the misleading way the issues have been formu-
lated, the parties have attached great significance to the char-
acterization of the telephone booth from which the petitioner
placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that
the booth was a "constitutionally protected area." The Gov-
ernment has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But
this effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in
the abstract, is "constitutionally protected" deflects attention
from the problem presented by this case. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what lie seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.61
Katz demonstrated that the Supreme Court was no longer inclined
to limit the Amendment to a narrow reading of its text. Rather than
focusing on the particular area or thing searched and attempting to
determine whether that was an area or a thing meant to be protected
by the Founders, the Court found that the proper focus of Fourth
Amendment analysis is on the individual whose person or property is
searched and on the society in which that person lives. If the defendant
has acted to keep the area searched private, and if society is willing to
acknowledge the reasonableness of that expectation of privacy, 52 then
4° Katz, 389 U.S. at 349,352.
50 Id. at 351-52.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
52
 In his concurrence, Justice John Marshall Harlan expressed the Supreme Court's
new test in terms of these two elements, stating, "My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
96
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the Fourth Amendment is implicated when that area is investigated by
law enforcement." If a defendant has not taken steps to keep her ac-
tions private or if society is not prepared to validate an expectation of
privacy, however, then the Fourth Amendment is not implicated, even if
the search involves one of the areas—houses, persons, papers, and ef-
fects—explicitly protected by the Amendment's text. 54
D. Criticisms ofKatz
Although the Katz approach is certainly less faithful to the text of
the Fourth Amendment than was Olmstead, commentators have argued
over the last three and a half decades about whether the new standard
affords greater or lesser protection to individuals than did the older,
more textual approach. In fact, during this time, Katz has been subject
to serious criticisms from both the right 55 and the left. 56 Those on the
left have seen it as an insufficient guarantee against invasions of privacy
because the Amendment's protections are apparently made contingent
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). This is the current understanding of the test. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring)) (dis-
cussing justice Harlan's concurrence in explicating Katz).
55 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
54 See id.
65 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explain-
ing that "the only thing the past three decades have established about the Katz test . . . is
that, unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectation [sl of privacy' 'that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable,"' bear an uncanny resemblance to those expecta-
tions of privacy that this Court considers reasonable" (citations omitted)); Richard A. Pos-
ner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. Or. REv. 173, 186, 188
(describing the conception of privacy as treated by Katz as "too obvious to merit extended
discussion" and arguing that the contradictions created by the Katz formulation are based
on "threadbare arguments"); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 508-09 (Black, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a move from concrete conceptions such as searches and seizures to more
nebulous ones such as privacy was unlikely to be protective of individual rights).
56 See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1294-95 (1981) (arguing that the Katz test created "a new
graduated approach to the fourth amendment that is based on the recognition of degrees
of privacy expectations," which, at least under the Burger Court, "resulted in a dangerous
narrowing of the fourth amendment's substantive scope"); Lillian R. BeVier, The Communi-
cations Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T,
51 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1066 n.64 (1999) ("Though Katz itself seemed to extend the Fourth
Amendment's reach, the Court's protection of privacy since Katz has been less than gener-
ous. The reason this is so, according to commentators, is that justice Harlan's conception
of reasonableness is not defined well enough to delineate clearly protected zones.") (citing
Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government
and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1752 n.2 (1994); and Lawrence Lessig, Reading the
Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emoitv L.J. 869, 905 n.104 (1996)).
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on the very government practices the Amendment is supposed to regu-
late. For example, consider what would happen if the government were
simply to announce that all phones would henceforth be tapped and
monitored at. random." Certainly if people were made aware of this
change in government conduct, it would be unreasonable for them to
presume that their conversations were private, and no search would
occur when the government eavesdropped on these conversations.
Therefore, if Katz is taken literally, the government could, by fiat, ex-
pand the scope of permissible searches almost without limit.
Conversely, conservatives have argued that the test in Katz is both
results-driven and malleable. These critics, Justice Antonin Scalia prin-
cipal among them, have contended that there is nothing in either the
text or the history of the Fourth Amendment to justify the Katz a,p-
proach and that only a standard grounded in the text and original un-
derstanding of the Fourth Amendment can provide both judicial integ-
rity and consistent results. 58
II. K472 V. UNITED STATES IN PRACTICE—A Focus ON
PRIVATE ACTION
Despite the widespread criticism of Katz v. United States, it remains
the principal standard for evaluating whether government conduct
constitutes a search,59 Of course, the Katz formulation, like the Fourth
Amendment it interprets, is hardly self-applying. In the more than
thirty years that have passed since Katz was decided, the Court has
slowly fleshed out this doctrine, not in a systematic way, but by accre-
tion. There have been few monumental Fourth Amendment decisions
since Katz; rather, the contours of the doctrine to which it has given
rise have slowly come into relief. In this Fart, I discuss this doctrinal
development, pointing out the importance the Supreme Court has
57
 Sadly, this example is becoming less and less hypothetical. The Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("USA PATRIOT Act") greatly expanded the power of gov-
ernment to conduct wiretaps against citizens. See Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001);
Stephen R. McAllister et al., Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, 51 U.
RAN. L. REV. 219,230-31 (2003) (discussing roving wiretaps).
58 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034.-35 (1992) (Scalia, j.)
(criticizing Katz as being circular, in that expectations of privacy are defined in terms of
what a court finds to be reasonable); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Scalia,
J.) (critiquing Katz as a standard for whether or not a search has occurred).
59 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (discussing Katz as the ap-
propriate standard for evaluating the extent of the Fourth Amendment).
98	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 46:83
attached to the conduct of private actors in determining the extent of
constitutional rights.
A. Abandoned Property
If an individual has abandoned his property, there is obviously no
longer even a subjective expectation of privacy in it, let alone one that
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Although this argument is
relatively uncontroversial in the abstract, it leaves unanswered the
question of what it means to abandon property. Consider, for exam-
ple, the 1988 case of California v. Greenwood." Acting on information
indicating that Billy Greenwood might be engaged in narcotics
trafficking, police twice obtained from his regular trash collector gar-
bage bags left by Greenwood on the curb in front of his house. 61
 On
the basis of items in the bags that were indicative of narcotics use, the
police obtained warrants to search the house and discovered con-
trolled substances during the subsequent search.62 On appeal from
Greenwood's conviction, the Supreme Court held that no search oc-
curred when the officers went. through the contents of Greenwood's
trash bags and that the subsequent, warranted search need not be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree:
Here, we conclude that respondents exposed their gar-
bage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth
Amendment. protection. It is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are read-
ily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed
their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of conveying
it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have
sorted through respondents' trash or permitted others, such
as the police, to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their
garbage "in an area particularly suited for public inspection
and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the
6° 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
Si Id. at 37-38.
62 Id. In this case, as in many of the others discussed below, the question before the Su-
preme Court was whether the first investigation done by law enforcement, in this case look-
ing through the collected trash, constitutes a search. If not, then the Fourth Amendment
does not regulate the challenged conduct and the information thus obtained may later be
used in obtaining a warrant. lf, however, the first investigation is a search, it must comply
with the Fourth Amendment or else the evidence derived from it becomes inadmissible.
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express purpose of having strangers take it," respondents
could have had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
inculpatory items that they discarded. 63
This is perhaps the clearest statement from the Court that when an
individual has made a part of his life transparent to the public, he has
made it available to the government as well. The defendant simply
could not have had an expectation of privacy in his discarded trash
because he could reasonably . foresee that members of the public
would go through it. Because he knowingly allowed the possibility that
others would gain access to his trash, he was not permitted to object
when the government sought to do the same thing.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that when a private
actor actually invades a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy,
the government may subsequently do so as well, at. least to the extent
that the private actor already has. For example, in 1984, in United
States u Jacobsen," the Supreme Court upheld a search by federal drug
agents that followed the opening of a sealed package by private
freight transporters . 66 After employees of Federal Express had opened
a sealed package in their possession and discovered that it contained a
white powder, they resealed it and contacted law enforcement
officials.66
 The federal officers then re-opened the package and con-
ducted a field test that indicated that the white powder was cocaine 67
63 Id. at 40-41 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397,
399 (3d Cir. 1981)). In his dissentjustice William Brennan argued that the mere fact that
the bags might be rifled through was not enough to cause the defendant to lose his rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in them:
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage
through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their
contents any more than the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of
privacy in the home; or the possibility of a private intrusion negates an expec-
tation of privacy in an un-opened package; or the possibility that an operator
will listen in on a telephone conversation negates an expectation of privacy in
the words spoken on the telephone.
486 U.S. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As resonant as this argument might be, the Su-
preme Court has continued to focus on the possibility of a private search, not necessarily
its legality.
64 466 U.S. 109,126 (1984).
ea Id. at 111. Employees of the shipper testified that the package had been inadver-
tently torn by a forklift and had subsequently been opened pursuant to a written company
policy regarding insurance claims. Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 111-12.
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In upholding the re-opening of the package and the field test,
the Court re-emphasized that the private search did not implicate the
Fourth Amendment,68
 and that law enforcement officials are not obli-
gated to avert their gaze from information supplied to them by third
parties.° The Court went on to hold that although the defendant had
enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package before it
was opened by the shippers, that expectation was severed when the
package was actually opened:
Mil this case the fact that agents of the private carrier inde-
pendently opened the package and made an examination
that might have been impermissible for a government agent
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unrea-
sonable. The reasonableness of an official invasion of the
citizen's privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as
they existed at the time that invasion occurred. 7°
Thus, although the government officials could not have been the first
to open the package—because the defendant had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy at the time he sent it—they were permitted to re-
open it because any expectation of privacy they thereby invaded had
been lost by the initial, private intrusion. The fact that the private ac-
tor did something the government would not have been permitted to
66 Id. at 113-14.
69
 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 130.
70
 Id. at 114-15. The Court went on to state that the field cocaine test did not amount
to a search because it revealed nothing about the contents of the container except whether
it contained a particular kind of contraband, a fact in which the defendant could not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 121; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983) (finding that a sniff by a drug detecting dog, because it discloses only whether
or not an individual possesses contraband, is not a search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses). See generally Sam Kamin, Law and Technology: The Case for a Smart Gun Detector, LAIN &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1996, at 221 (arguing that a scan with an advanced metal detec-
tor that could indicate in real time whether or not an individual is armed would not con-
stitute a Fourth Amendment search).
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do" simply did not convert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, po-
lice conduct. into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment."
Thus, whether or not an individual enjoys a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy is not always a question over which she necessarily has
much control. Jacobsen wrapped his package tightly, making it as im-
pervious to discovery as was possible." Nonetheless, that expectation
of privacy was lost when the Federal Express employees broke into it;
Jacobsen's expectation of privacy was lost through no fault of his own.
Although Greenwood could have taken greater efforts to protect his
own privacy, Jacobsen simply could not. Jacobsen initially had a sub-
jective expectation of privacy that society was willing to recognize as
reasonable. Because of the conduct of other, private actors, however,
Jacobsen could not object when the government merely mimicked
this private invasion of his privacy.
B. Information Knowingly Exposed to Others
Just as one does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
those things he has physically abandoned, the Supreme Court has
held in a number of different contexts that an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information that
is knowingly supplied to a third party. This is so even if that informa-
tion is supplied for a very limited purpose and is expected to be kept
from others. For example, in United States n. Miller, agents of the fed-
eral govermnent subpoenaed the defendant's bank records, not from
the defendant himself, but from his bank. 74 In upholding the validity
of the subpoena, the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those records because he
had voluntarily given them to a third party:75
71
 The Court's statement that the initial search "might" have violated the Fourth
AITICJIthllelli if conducted by state actors seems generous; assuming the package was not
torn completely open by the forklift, it remained a closed container for which probable
cause and a warrant would have been required before a government search would have
been permissible. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114. It is not surprising, therefore, that at no
point did the government argue that if that search had been conducted by government
officials it would have been constitutional.
72 Of course, the Court's focus on the reasonableness of official conduct is hardly un-
usual. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (holding that a mentally
disturbed defendant's confession was voluntary because the pressure he felt came from the
voices in his head, not from police coercion).
75 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at Ill.
7'1 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
75 Id. at 443. Unlike many of the other cases discussed in this Article, Miller involved
the issuance of a subpoena duces teem rather than a search warrant. Id. at 436. Grand jury
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The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to an-
other, that the information will be conveyed by that person
to the Government. This Court has held repeatedly that the
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of in-
formation revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited pur-
pose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
be trayed , 76
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland, the telephone company installed,
at police request, a pen register on the defendant's phone line." A
pen register is a device that creates a list of the phone numbers called
from a particular line. 78 The Court held that the installation and use
of the pen register was not a search for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.79 The Court reasoned that information regarding which num-
bers were called by the defendant was made available to a third party
and was therefore not treated privately by the defendant:
[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual ex-
pectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone
users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the
telephone company, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed. All sub-
scribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has fa-
cilities for making permanent records of the numbers they
dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on
their monthly bills. In fact, pen registers and similar devices
are routinely used by telephone companies "for the purposes
of checking billing operations, detecting fraud, and prevent-
ing violations of law." ... Telephone users, in sum, typically
know that they must convey numerical information to the
subpoenas are governed by a different set of rules than search warrants: the governing
rules are generally those pertaining to the issuance of civil warrants rather than those of
the Fourth Amendment.. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 910 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) (finding
that "[t] he Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum too sweeping in its terms 'to be regarded as reasonable'") (quoting Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)). In Miller, however, the Supreme Court addressed whether a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy exists in the material subpoenaed. 425 U.S. at 442.
76 Miller, 425 U.S. at 493.
77 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
m Id. at 736 n.l.
79 Id. at 745-46.
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phone company; that the phone company has facilities for
recording this information; and that the phone company
does in fact record this information for a variety of legiti-
mate business purposes. Although subjective expectations
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor
any general expectation that the numbers they dial will re-
main secret.8°
Although the opinions in Smith and Miller are perfectly consistent
with the conclusion in Greenwood, the Court has not uniformly held
that what is exposed to one is exposed to all. For example, in Minne-
sota v. Olson,8' the Court upheld the Fourth Amendment rights of an
overnight house guest in a third party's home, finding that although
he had surrendered some of his privacy to his host, he had surren-
dered it only to his host:
That the guest has a host who has ultimate control of the
house is not inconsistent with the guest having a legitimate
expectation of privacy.... The point is that hosts will more
likely than not respect the privacy interests of their guests,
who are entitled to a legitimate expectation of privacy de-
spite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises
and do not have the legal authority to determine who may or
may not enter the household.82
This reasoning is directly counter to that of Smith and Miller In Olson
the Court reasoned that although a houseguest surrenders some of
her privacy to another, that does not mean that she loses any expecta-
tion of privacy vis-a-vis others. 88 In contrast, in Smith and Miller; the
Court reasoned that surrendering information to anyone is to risk
surrendering it to all. 84
80 Id. at 742-43 (citations omitted). Of course, the Court's statement that "subjective
expectations of privacy cannot be scientifically gauged" is demonstrably false. See id. at 743.
Researchers can test, and to a certain extent have tested the extent to which the public
considers various invasions of their privacy to be reasonable. Sec generally Christopher Slo-
bogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society, "42
Dula: L.J. 727 (1993) (reporting the results of a survey of which law enforcement practices
unreasonably infringe on individual privacy and liberty).
81 495 U.S. 91,99 (1990).
82 Id.
118 Id. at 99-100.
a4 Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
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Miller and Smith have never been repudiated and represent the
logical extension of the line of cases that begins with Katz. In Katz, the
Court stated that what one knowingly exposes to the public even in
one's own home is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. By the
time we reach Miller and Smith, however, the question is not whether
the individual has given away her privacy by making her life an open
book. Rather, in these cases, the Court asked whether any other per-
son has been given (or has gained) access to the information the gov-
ernment is seeking to obtain. If the answer is yes, the Court has held
that the area simply is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. Al-
though the Court's reasoning in these cases is hardly a model of con-
sistency, it is clear that an individual who knowingly shares informa-
tion with anyone, for any purpose, runs the risk of losing any
expectation of privacy in that information.
C. The Plain View Doctrine
One of the principal implications of Katz, one in fact envisioned by
the decision's own language, 85 was that even objects within the home
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment if they have been know-
ingly exposed to others. 88 This corollary to Katz has come to be known
as the plain view doctrine—as it is usually stated, if the police are in a
place they are legally entitled to be,87 and they observe contraband or
evidence of a crime that has been exposed to view, the Fourth Amend-
ment is not implicated by this viewing. 85 Because the Fourth Amend-
ment only governs searches and seizures,88 and because a search or sei-
85 See, e.g., 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the pub-
lie, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected." (citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
86 See id.
87 See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (stating that It] he plain-view
doctrine is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to ob-
serve an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may re-
tain the incidents of title and possession but not privacy") (emphasis added); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (finding that "the police officer must lawfully make an
'initial intrusion' or otherwise properly be in a position from which he can view a particular
area") (emphasis added) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)).
88 Furthermore, the police may seize the object if they have probable cause to believe
that it is either contraband or evidence of criminal activity. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 140-41 (1990). Law enforcement officials, however, may generally seize only those
objects that may be reached from a place they are legally entitled to be. Id. at 138-39.
88 For a critique of this doctrine, see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. For justice Scalia, inquiring
whether an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy ought to determine
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zure does not even occur, in the constitutional sense, unless a reason-
able expectation of privacy is invaded, this conduct need not even
comport with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. 9°
One thing that becomes clear in the Court's plain view cases,
however, is that the Court does not literally mean its statement that in
order for a plain view examination to fall outside the dictates of the
Fourth Amendment the officers must be lawfully in a position from
which to observe evidence in plain view. 91 Consider, for example, the
case of United States v. Dunn 9 2 In Dunn, officers of the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration observed a drug lab inside a barn on the defen-
dant's property.93
 Although it was true that the officers did not enter
the barn in order to make this observation, it could hardly be said
that the officers were "somewhere they were legally entitled to be":
The ranch was completely encircled by a perimeter fence,
and contained several interior barbed wire fences, including
one around the house approximately 50 yards from the
barn, and a wooden fence enclosing the front of the barn,
which had an open overhang and locked, waist-high gates.
whether the search that occurred was reasonable, not whether it ought to be termed a
search:
One might think that the new validating rationale would be that examin-
ing the portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it is a "search" de-
spite the absence of trespass, is not an "unreasonable" one under the Fourth
Amendment. Rut in fact we have held that visual observation is no "search" at
all—perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that
warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.
Id. (citations omitted).
90
 Sec Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. Rrv. 191, 191 (1986) (arguing that "113Jecause
government actions that are neither searches nor seizures are not governed by the
amendment, and therefore need not be 'reasonable,' the definitions of search and seizure
limit the scope of the amendment's protection of individual rights"). Of course, govern-
ment conduct must comport with the other applicable provisions of the Constitution; a
policy of conducting plain view searches only of cars registered to blacks or women, al-
though it would not violate the Fourth Amendment, would almost certainly violate the
Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (refus-
ing to invalidate pretextual stops and holding that "the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the
Fourth Amendment").
91 See Andreas, 463 U.S. at 771-72.
92
 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987).
99 Id. at 297-98.
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Without a warrant, officers crossed the perimeter fence, several of the
barbed wire fences, and the wooden fence in front of the barn. 94
Had a member of the public attempted to do the same thing, the indi-
vidual likely would have been liable to a suit in trespass and to possible
criminal prosecution as well. Nonetheless, the Court held that the
officers did not conduct a search when they observed the drug lab in
the barn.95
 Thus, the Court must mean something other than "lawfully
entitled" when it describes the conduct of the officers prior to making
their plain view observation. In later cases, it has become clear that
what the Court means is that the officers have not engaged in a Fourth
Amendment violation prior to observing evidence in plain view.
The Court came very close to stating this explicitly in its 1971
opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.96 After surveying a number of its
plain view cases, the Court summarized them as follows:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the po-
lice officer in each of them had a prior justification for an in-
trusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine
serves to supplement the prior justification—whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to law-
ful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present
unconnected with a search directed against the accused . . . 9 7
In other words, so long as her conduct does not otherwise consti-
tute a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the mere observation of
evidence in plain view does not convert an officer's conduct into an
illegal search. This position—that plain view requires that the officer's
conduct prior to the plain view observation comply with the Fourth
Amendment—is now the view of most of the federal circuit courts of
appeals.98
" Id. at 294 (syllabus) (emphasis added).
96 Id. at 304.
96 403 U.S. at 466.
97 Id.
98
 For example, some of the federal circuit courts of appeals have cited the U.S. Su-
preme Court's 1990 decision, Horton v. California, For its proposition that the plain view
rule is satisfied if the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the
place from which the evidence could be plainly viewed." See, e.g., United States v.
$557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Horton, 496
U.S. at 136-37); United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 219 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Horton,
496 U.S. at 136); United States v. Elwood, 993 F.2d 1146, 1152 n.28 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136); see also United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 653 (6th Cir. 2002)
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One of my central theses is that this subtle, semantic shift in how
the Court defines plain view—moving from a conception of plain view
based on the legality of the official conduct to one based on whether
the officer has committed a Fourth Amendment violation prior to
making the plain view observation—is crucial. Because the foresee-
ability, not the legality, of official conduct has become the central in-
quiry in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy ex-
ists, laws designed to protect individual privacy from private actors are
unlikely to increase the scope of privacy from the government. As
Dunn eloquently demonstrates, the mere fact that a public official has
failed to comply with a civil or criminal statute designed to protect
individuals from one another will, at most, be relevant in determining
whether that official has invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy;
it will certainly not be dispositive of that issue. Furthermore, as I ar-
gue below, such laws very well may be counterproductive. To the ex-
tent that they lull individuals into a false sense of security regarding
their privacy, these laws may be a greater threat to privacy than the
absence of such laws would be.
1. Rejection of the Inadvertence Rule
Prior to 1990, at least a plurality of the Supreme Court had held
that discoveries of evidence in plain view had to be inadvertent to be
permissible;" in other words, the rule stated that although an officer
may lawfully discover contraband or evidence of crimes in plain view,
the officer may not affirmatively seek it out.'" The Court finally re-
jected this rule in Horton v. California, 101 holding that inquiry into the
minds of law enforcement officers was not constructive and that the
(finding that the relevant question was whether the "Fourth Amendment prohibited [the
officerl from walking" to the place where the plain view observation was made). Some of
the federal circuit courts of appeals have defined lawful presence in terms of whether an
independent Fourth Amendment violation had taken place. See, e.g., United States v.
Collins, 321 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1202-03
(10th Cir. 2002); Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 2000).
°° See, e.g., Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (Stewart, J., joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall, D.) (explaining that "the 'plain view' doctrine has been applied where a police
officer is riot searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object").
100 The seeming rationale for this rule was that although the Constitution cannot require
officers to avert their eyes when they see evidence of wrongdoing, it does not permit them to
seek out that evidence if they have some reason to believe it will be found. See id.
'°' 496 U.S. at 141.
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inadvertence rule encouraged dishonesty in law enforcement
officials.'°2
After Horton, law enforcement officials were permitted to do what
many had suspected them of doing all along, namely, engaging in
searches for evidence in plain view. Thus, an officer may now walk
along a public street, peering into every car window the officer comes
across.'" Because one cannot have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in something she has left on the seat of her car—if she really
wanted that object to remain private, she would have placed it in the
glove box or trunk of the car—no search occurs when an officer con-
ducts such an investigation. Because no search is conducted when an
officer conducts a plain view investigation, 1 °4
 no suspicion whatsoever
is required; an officer need not even have a hunch that evidence of a
crime will be found in order to conduct a plain view search. In doing
away with the inadvertence requirement, the Supreme Court has
moved its plain view jurisprudence even further from a focus on what
the officer is doing toward an examination of what anyone else might
do. Because a member of the public may walk down the street snoop-
ing in the windows of parked cars, an officer may do so as wel1. 1 °5
102 Id. at 138. The Supreme Court has, in other contexts, avoided adopting rules that
would create an incentive for police deception. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S.
334, 342 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Fourth Amendment rule that
turns on [the officer's] purpose could prevent police alone from intruding where other
strangers freely tread"); Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (finding that the "Fourth Amendment's
concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent* of the officer).
I" See, e.g., Brown, 460 U.S. at 790. In Texas v. Brown, the Supreme Court stated the fol-
lowing:
The general public could peer into the interior of Brown's automobile from
any number of angles; there is no reason Maples should be precluded from
observing as an officer what would be entirely visible to him as a private citi-
zen. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy shielding that portion of
the interior of an automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle
by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers.
Id. (citations omitted).
1°' See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (finding that although the
slightest moving or opening of an object discovered in plain view is a search, no search
occurs when officers merely make observations of objects left available to their view).
1 °5
 One recent case, however, has called into question the Supreme Court's rejection of
the inadvertence rule. In Bond v. United States, the Court appeared to return to an interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment based in part on the intent of the officer. 529 U.S. at 338-
39. In that case, a federal officer boarded a stopped bus and manipulated the defendant's
soft-sided luggage in an overhead bin to determine whether it contained contraband. Id. at
335-36. In holding that the manipulation of the bag constituted a search and was thus pre-
sumptively unconstitutional in the absence of a search warrant, the Court distinguished
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2. Technologies to Improve Plain View
We have seen that in cases where the officer merely sees contra-
band with the naked eye, the application of the plain view doctrine or
one of its analogs will validate the search. 106
 Cases often arise, how-
ever, involving law enforcement officials who have augmented their
between the sort of invasions of privacy a passenger expects when he places his bag in an
overhead compartment from the sort of invasion visited on Bond's bag in this case:
[A) bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not
expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course, feel
the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the agent did here.
We therefore hold that the agent's physical manipulation of petitioner's bag
violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 338-39. The dissent objected to this distinction, pointing out that in the past, the
Court had inquired into whether what the officer was doing was something a member of
the public could have done as well, rather than whether the officer had the same intention
that the member of the public did:
Of course, the agent's purpose here—searching for drugs—differs dramatically
from the intention of a driver or fellow passenger who squeezes a bag in the
process of making more room for another parcel. But in determining
whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable, it is the effect, not the pur-
pose. that matters.
Id. at 341 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Even applying the dissent's standard to the facts of the
case, however, the majority's reasoning seems sound. The majority explained that the sort
of manipulation done by the officers was different in kind from the sort of touching one
expects on a public bus, not merely because of the officers' intent, but because that intent
drove them to manipulate the bags differently. Id. at 338-39. Although one's bag might be
pushed, compressed, moved, or otherwise abused by one's fellow passengers, one does not
expect these passengers to do the sort of invasive manipulation that would reveal a bag's
contents. The officers did a different search than members of the public would have done,
and it was this practical difference, rather than any difference in the officers' state of
mind, that made the difference in the case.
108
 The courts have extended the plain view doctrine to cover senses other than vision.
Thus, if an officer, in the course of a properly circumscribed frisk for weapons, feels some-
thing that is immediately apparent as contraband, the discovery of the contraband is not
itself a search requiring independent constitutional justification. See, e.g., Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1993) (applying the plain view doctrine to the sense of
touch). Similarly, if an officer is somewhere she is lawfully entitled to be and smells some-
thing that indicates that criminal activity is afoot, or hears a sound that leads her to believe
that such activity is occurring, no further search has occurred. See, e.g., United States v.
Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying the plain view doctrine to the sense
of smell); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying the
plain view doctrine to the sense of hearing).
In each of these cases, the court's rationale is that the suspect, by exposing incriminat-
ing evidence to the sense of touch, hearing, or smell of the officer, has indicated that the
suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Because the officer is
merely doing what another member of the public might do, she conducts no search when
her senses indicate the presence of contraband.
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senses with devices designed to facilitate the discovery of evidence of
criminal wrongdoing. To take perhaps the most innocuous example,
an officer peering into a car window from the sidewalk on a sunny day
clearly has not conducted a search and may make this investigation
without any prior suspicion that lie will discover evidence of criminal
activity. When the officer conducts the same investigation on a moon-
less evening, however, and must use a flashlight to see in the window,
a more complicated case is presented.
Nonetheless, the federal courts have consistently held that the
use of simple devices to improve the senses does not elevate an oth-
erwise permissible investigation to the level of a search. For example,
more than seventy-five years ago in United States v. Lee, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the "use of a searchlight is comparable to the
use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the Consti-
tution.”107
 Although the issue has rarely reached the Supreme Court
since, the lower federal courts have unanimously held that the use of
simple devices such as flashlights, 108
 binoculars,w° step-ladders,"° and
the like simply does not transform police investigations into searches.
A more difficult question is presented by law enforcement's use
of more sophisticated technologies. Take, for example, the 1986 case
of California v. Ciraolo. 111
 Hoping to gain evidence of marijuana culti-
vation, police officers flew over the defendant's property in a bor-
rowed private plane and observed the plants growing there." 2 The
plants were eight to ten feet high and were seen and photographed
growing in a fifteen- to twenty-five-foot plot in the defendant's yard." 3
Based on this observation, a search warrant was obtained, the plants
were seized, and the defendant was convicted for their cultivation. 114
On appeal, the government argued that no search occurred
when the officers overflew the shed, and the Court agreed:
1 °7
 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421,427 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "the
agent's use of a flashlight did not keep the cash in the bag from being in 'plain view' and
therefore seizable under the logic of Coolidge v. New Hampshire") (citation omitted).
1 °9 See, e.g., United States V. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282,1290-91 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that
use of ordinary binoculars does not constitute a Fourth Amendment "search").
110 See, e.g., United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335,1345 (4th Cir. 1981) (finding that
an officer's use of a stepladder "did not infringe in any way the defendants' legitimate
expectation of privacy").
" 1
 476 U.S. 207,213-14 (1986).
112 Id. at 209.
M
"4 Id. at 209-10.
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That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all
police observation, The Fourth Amendment protection of
the home has never been extended to require law enforce-
ment officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere fact that an indi-
vidual has taken measures to restrict some views of his activi-
ties preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage
point where he has a right to be and which renders the ac-
tivities clearly visible. . . .
The observations by [the officers] in this case took place
within public navigable airspace, in a physically nonintrusive
manner; from this point they were able to observe plants
readily discernible to the naked eye as marijuana. That the
observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the
plants and the officers were trained to recognize marijuana
is irrelevant. Such observation is precisely what a judicial
officer needs to provide a basis for a warrant. Any member of
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could
have seen everything that these officers observed." 5
A number of aspects of Ciraolo are noteworthy. First, although the
Court states that it does not require the officers to turn a blind eye to
criminal activity observed from a public thoroughfare, that hardly de-
scribes what the officers in this case were doing. The officers had ac-
quired a plane for the express purpose of flying over the defendant's
property to look down at it to find criminal evidence." 0 Although the
inadvertence rule had been rejected by the time Ciraolo was de-
cided, 117
 to justify this decision on the ground that deciding otherwise
would effectively require officers to ignore criminal evidence that they
stumble upon seems entirely beside the point." 8
116 Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
16 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. It appears that the police, lacking a plane for overflight
purposes, proceeded to charter one in order to investigate the tip regarding the defen-
dant's marijuana cultivation. Sec id.
117 Sec supra notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
1'8 Of course, the Bond decision, taken to its logical conclusion, would call into ques-
tion a number of the Court's landmark cases, including Ciraolo. Sec Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-
39; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14. Although the officers were indeed flying where a member
of the public could have flown, their interest in the defendant's illicit plants caused them
to fly in a way calculated to find the marijuana, a manner of flight that a member of the
public was unlikely to undertake. As I argue above, however, the Court has thus far not ex-
tended Bond beyond its holding. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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Note also that Ciraolo was decided in part on the somewhat sur-
prising basis that the police officers were in Federal Aviation Admini-
stration navigable airspace at the time they observed the marijuana
growing on the defendant's property. 119
 Given that the Federal Avia-
tion Administration is charged with protecting the public safety rather
than privacy,"° this may seem an unusual ground for the decision. Yet
the implication of this observation, as the dissent points out,"i is that
the police in this case were merely doing what members of the public
could do; they were only flying where a member of the public could
fly. Because the defendant failed to protect himself from this foresee-
able invasion of his privacy by protecting his property from aerial sur-
veillance, he cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
crops he was growing therein."2
 As we have seen, however, even if the
police were somewhere members of the public could not legally go,
the result would not likely have been different; the Court's focus is
generally on what members of the public could do as a practical mat-
ter, not what they are permitted to do as a legal matter.
Note finally that the Court's focus is on the risks that the defen-
dant has exposed himself to from members of the public rather than
on any actual diminution of his privacy. Ciraolo is thus different from
Smith and Miller, in which the defendants had already made their in-
formation available to others and from Jacobsen, in which a third party
"9
 476 U.S. at 213 (noting that qt] he observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in
this case took place within public navigable airspace").
120 See Fen. AVIATION ADMIN., MISSION, VISION, VALUES, at hup://www.faa.gov/aboutfaa/
Mission.cfm (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (claiming that the Federal Aviation Administration's
mission is "[t]o provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world").
121 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). In his dissent in Ciraolo, Justice Lewis
Powell stated the following:
The Court's holding ... must rest solely on the fact that members of the
public fly in planes and may look down at homes as they fly over them. The
Court does not explain why it finds this fact to be significant. One may as-
sume that the Court believes that citizens bear the risk that air travelers will
observe activities occurring within backyards that are open to the sun and air.
Id (citation omitted).
122 Some courts and commentators have described this rationale as an outgrowth of
the assumption-of-risk doctrine—if an individual has not protected himself against a fore-
seeable, private invasion of privacy, then he has assumed the risk of a similar invasion of
privacy by law enforcement officials. See. e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (finding that Smith had
"assumed the risk that the [phone] company would reveal to the police the numbers he
[had] dialed" from his home telephone); Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual
Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century. 72 Miss.L.J. 51. 135 (2002) (claiming
that nder the assumption of risk theory, the disclosure of information to a third party
denies Fourth Amendment protection to what might otherwise be private information").
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had deprived the defendant of his privacy. 123 In Ciraolo, there was no
intimation that members of the public regularly or even occasionally
overflew the defendant's rural property. Nonetheless, the Court.
found no invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy because the
officers were doing what a member of the public might do.
The same day that it decided Ciraolo, the Court also decided Dow
Chemical Co. v.. United States.'" In Dow Chemical, the Court rejected the
defendant's argument that the government's warrantless, sophisti-
cated aerial photography of its chemical plant was a search.'" Using
language that. the Court would echo in its Kyllo v. United States deci-
sion, the Court held that although
Mt may well be ... that surveillance of private property by
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not gen-
erally available to the public, such as satellite technology,
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant....
the photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details
as to raise constitutional concerns.'"
Defendants should not be expected to shield themselves front inva-
sions by unknown threats, the Court seemingly reasoned; by contrast,
when the risk is one that defendants face from their peers, their fail-
ure to protect. themselves from it is an indication that they do not.
have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, the Court explicitly rejected Dow's contention that
the use of aerial photography constituted a search because, had it
been done by a competitor, such an invasion would violate state trade
secret laws.' 27 Repeating the proposition that state tort law does not
define the contours of the Fourth Amendment,'" the Court rejected
this argument in short order.' 29, The Court stated that government
investigations raise the specter of different harms than those raised by
unfair competition in the private sector,'" and that the fact that gov-
125 Compare Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, with Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114-15, Smith, 442 U.S. at
742-43, and Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
124 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
125 Id,
126 Id. at 238.
127 Id. at 232.
128
129 Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 232.
is° See id. at 232. But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (finding that a helicopter overflight from 400 feet did not violate the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy, but that "[va]e would have a different case if flying at
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ernment conduct would have been tortious or criminal if done by a
private actor is but one factor to be considered in determining
whether that conduct violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. 131
D. The State of the Law: Kyllo v. United States
In its 2000 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a case that
commentators anticipated would force the Justices to confront head-
on the question of how emerging technologies would affect the scope
of the Fourth Amendment. In Kyllo v. United States,n2 the Supreme
Court invalidated an investigation based in part on the use of a ther-
mal imaging device to measure the heat coming off a suspected mari-
juana cultivator's home. Instead of confronting the technology ques-
tion directly, however, the Court looked to the past, principally to Katz
and Dow Chemical, in search of answers. 133
Federal law enforcement officials suspected Danny Kyllo of grow-
ing marijuana inside his home using high-intensity grow lamps.134 To
confirm these suspicions, the officers used a thermal imaging device,
that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation"). hi Riley, five Justices rejected the
plurality's view that Federal Aviation Administration regulations should control the ques-
tion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 452-68 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring; Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, JI., dissenting; Blackmun, J., dissenting). For ex-
ample, in her concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated the following:
In determining whether Riley had a reasonable expectation of privacy from
aerial observation, the relevant inquiry after Ciraolo is not whether the heli-
copter was where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, consis-
tent with Katz, we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at
an altitude at which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity
that Riley's expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'"
Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
131 See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 232.
"2 533 U.S. at 40.
135 See id. at 32, 34. Kyllo has already generated an enormous literature on its implica-
tions for privacy and technology. See generally Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Concep-
tual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119
(2002); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325 (2002); Richard H. Seamon, Kyllo v.
United States and the Partial Ascendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment, 79 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1013 (2001); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303 (2002); Christopher
Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Govern-
ing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1393 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth
Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, LAW & CON-
TEstr. PROBS., Spring 2002, at 125.
tss Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
2004]	 Private Aaron in Defining the Fourth Amendment
	
115
the Agema Thermovision 210, to measure the heat patterns coming
off of Kyllo's building.'" The thermal scan conducted from the street
in front of Kyllo's house revealed that "the roof over the garage and a
side wall of petitioner's home were relatively hot compared to the rest
of the home and substantially warmer than neighboring homes in
[Kyllo's] triplex."'" Based in part on this information, the officers
sought and obtained a warrant to search Kyllo's home. More than one
hundred marijuana plants were found, and Kyllo was indicted on one
count of manufacturing marijuana in violation of federal law." 7
 Kyllo
entered a conditional guilty plea and appealed, arguing that the
thermal scan of his house was a search and should be presumed to be
unconstitutional in the absence of a warrant. 138
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the use of a technology
to obtain information regarding the interior of a home is a search, at
least when the technology in question "is not in general public use." 139
This language, lifted almost verbatim from Dow Chemical,'" makes ab-
solutely clear the importance of private conduct to the definition of
reasonable expectations of privacy. Once individuals can be fairly
charged with an awareness of a technology and its implications, the
Court reasoned, they are responsible for protecting themselves from
its possible invasions."' If they fail to do so, they cannot complain
when the government later uses that technology to discover informa-
tion about them; the question of whether individuals have "knowingly
expose [d] "142 an area to the public turns, therefore, on whether or
not they failed to protect themselves from a known threat.
133 Id.
156 1d. at 30.
151 1d.
138 1d.
139 Kylio, 533 U.S. at 40 (finding that "Ndhere, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have
been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presump-
tively unreasonable without a warrant").
149
 See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238 (stating that "[i] t may well be, as the Government
concedes, that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant").
14/ See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
142 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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E. Conclusion
For much of American history, there was a marriage between the
contours of the Fourth Amendment and the contours of private law." 5
For example, at common law, it was a defense to an action brought in
trespass that- the defendant was a public official engaged in a legal
search; that which was trespass was constitutionally impermissible and
that which was constitutionally permissible was no trespass." 4 This mar-
riage continued well into the twentieth century.
To a large extent, however, the twentieth century witnessed a
growing disconnect between private ordering and public ordering. As
many of the cases cited above clearly indicate, the scope of property
law simply no longer determines the contours of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 145
 Time and again, the Supreme Court stated that although the
existence of private law—property, tort, or contract—may be relevant
in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists,
that law is not dispositive of the constitutional question.
Furthermore, the above cases make clear that, to a large extent,
private law has been replaced as an ordering principle with private con-
duct; courts now focus on what a member of the public could do rather
143 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
144 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928); Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (K.B. 1765).
143 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1979) (finding that
"(e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be
based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an
interest"); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (finding that shared
authority over property, rather than "mere property interest," is the proper standard for
determining the permissible scope of third-party consent to search); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (finding
that "[i]nherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of an-
cient niceties of tort or real property law"); Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amend-
ment Protect: Property, Privacy or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 309-27 (1998) (war-
big the property right basis of the Fourth Amendment from its origins in Boyd and Eirtick
through its demise in the last third of the twentieth century). The Supreme Court in Mir-
den v. Hayden stated the following:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be '`unreasonable" within
the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior
property interest at common law. We have recognized that the principal ob-
ject of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than prop-
erty, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested
on property concepts.
387 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
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than on what the law would permit the individual to do. 146 As the law
stands today, if an individual has exposed her trash to her neighbors,
she has exposed it to the police as well; 147 if she has shared information
with her bank or phone company, she has exposed it to the police as
well; 148 if she has inadvertently made part of her property visible to those
flying overhead, she has exposed it to the police as well. 149
Thus, as I have argued from the outset, although the Fourth
Amendment does not govern private conduct, that conduct is far from
irrelevant in defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The more
that an individual exposes to private actors, the more difficult it be-
comes to keep that same information from governmental actors should
they seek to gain access to it as well. Even if the government official was
doing something that a private individual could be sued or prosecuted
for doing, that fact will not be dispositive of the Fourth Amendment
inquiry. Iii determining the current scope of our rights, therefore, it
becomes relevant just how much information that an individual might
think of as private has actually been exposed to or shared with others.
III. THE EXTENT OF PRIVATE SNOOPING
Clearly; if the contours of the Fourth Amendment are defined in
part by private, intrusive conduct, it is important to understand the
extent of that conduct. In this Part, I demonstrate that, largely owing
to advances in surveillance and information technology, Americans are
currently subject to scrutiny—from their employers, insurers, advertis-
ers, and even their neighbors—as they never have been before. 188
Although such invasions of privacy are impossible to catalogue ex-
haustively, I set forth some of the examples that have made news and
have particularly concerned privacy advocates in recent years. I focus in
this Part on the following three broad categories of private conduct:
workplace surveillance, 191 consumer information misuse, 152 and medi-
cal privacy intrusions.'" With respect to each example, I discuss how
technology has facilitated the acquisition of personal information by
115 See, e.g., Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40; Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
117 Sec supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
118 Sec supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
113 Sec supra notes 111-123 and accompanying text.
150 See generally JEFFREv ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY
IN Am ERICA (2000) (arguing that to live in the modern era is to be subject to surveillance).
151 See infra notes 159-188 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
153 See infra notes 211-241 and accompanying text.
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private actors and the implications of these private actors' conduct for
the contours of the Fourth Amendment.
One thing that becomes clear as we study these areas of law is that
there are no blanket privacy protections provided by federal statute; 154
rather, different areas—the workplace, consumer information, medical
information—are each covered, in varying degrees, by an alphabet
soup of federal legislation. For example, the Video Privacy Protection
Act (the "VPPA") 155 guards records of video rentals from unauthorized
public disclosure; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act ("HIPAA") l56
 governs the disclosure of medical information to
those other than health care providers; and the Children's Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act ("COPPA") 157
 regulates commercial websites' ability
to collect personal information from minors. Rather than creating an
omnibus privacy act, Congress has reacted to high-profile privacy con-
cerns by attempting to remedy specific privacy threats. 158 As a result,
each context presents its own legal issues and must be analyzed inde-
pendently.
A. Workplace Surveillance
The average American who works full time spends nearly forty-
three hours per week at work; 159 in other words, between Monday and
Friday the average worker now spends nearly as many waking hours at
work as at home. Furthermore, as the average amount of time workers
spend at work has gone up, so too has the surveillance to which these
workers are subjected. 16° As employers attempt to maintain and in-
154 See, e.g., Rita Hennes, Foreword, Internet Privacy Law, Policy, and Practice: State, Federal,
and International Perspectives, 54 ME. L. REV. 95, 96 (2002) (explaining that "(w] hile the EU
has established broad standards for individual privacy protection, the United States gov-
ernment focused only on narrow categories of sensitive data") (citation omitted).
15s
	 Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
156 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
157 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
155
 I have argued elsewhere that legislatures do much the same thing in the context of
criminal justice policy. See FRANKLIN E. ZDARING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM V.-AMIN, PUNISH-
MENT AND DEMOCRACY, THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT iN CALIFORNIA 181-216 (2001)
(arguing that legislatures inevitably attempt to solve the last criminal justice problem, not the
next one).
159 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF um UNITED STATES: 2002, at 375
tb1.575 (2003) (showing that the average full time worker worked 42.9 hours in 2001).
1 E° See generally Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employees: The
Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modern Sweatshop, 41 1)EPAUI. L.
REV. 739 (1992); Jay P. Kesan, Cyber-Working or Cyber*Shirkingh A First Principles Examination
ofElectronic Privacy in the Workplace, 54 FLA. L. REV, 289 (2002).
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crease the productivity that has fueled the American economy in re-
cent years,'°' they are increasingly turning to technologies that allow
them to keep tabs on their employees' activities while at work.
It is true, of course, that employers have always had an incentive
to supervise their employees closely; an unsupervised employee can
steal, shirk, or otherwise cost the employer money. As the American
economy has moved from one based on manufacturing to one based
on the service sector and information technologies, 162 however, em-
ployers have largely shifted the focus of their surveillance. No longer
are their primary concerns workplace safety and preventing simple
theft. Rather, employers are now increasingly concerned with insulat-
ing themselves from litigation, preventing the misappropriation of
their intellectual property, and limiting unproductive work time)" As
their concerns have changed, so have the tools available to employers
to ensure employee compliance with workplace rules.
I. State of the Art
As with each of the other areas of private conduct discussed in this
Part, workplace surveillance has been both changed immeasurably and
facilitated by the advent of technologies designed specifically for that
purpose. The most obvious example of this technology-powered sur-
veillance is management's monitoring of the computers it provides to
its employees. More than half of the American workforce now spends at
least some part of the day in front of a computer, 164 and as anyone who
161 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 159, at 392 tb1.601 (showing that between 1980
and 2001 business sector productivity increased nearly 50% while manufacturing produc-
tivity rose nearly 100%).
182 See id. (showing that between 1980 and 2001 the percentage of all workers em-
ployed in the production of goods dropped from 28.4% to 19.0% while service jobs rose
from 19.8% to 31.0% of the economy).
1" See, e.g., RosEN, supra note 150, at 79-90 (cataloguing the widespread use of technol-
ogy to monitor employees in the American workforce and describing the threat of sexual
harassment litigation as one of the main justifications offered for the surveillance); John M.
Conlin, The Case for Watching Employees on the 111th, DENv. Bus. J., Jan. 28, 2000, at 14B (It is a
statistical certainty that sooner or later Internet misuse will create a serious problem for
most organizations. It might be as simple as productivity loss or as serious as multi-million
dollar lawsuits or corporate espionage."); Kristen Bell DeTienne & Richard D. Flint, The
Boss's Eyes and Ears: A Case Study of Electronic Employee Monitoring and the Privacy for Consumers
and Worhers Act, 12 LAB. LAW 93, 96 (1996) ("Employers ... justify electronic monitoring as
a necessary protection against potential liability. Under the legal theory of respondent supe-
rior, employers can be liable for various injuries caused by their employees.").
164 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT or 'ME UNITED STATES: 2004-2005,
at 407 tb1.617 (2004) (reporting that 53.5% of those employed used a computer at their
main job). One recent study reported that out of a total U.S. workforce of 190,000,000
120	 Boston College Law Review
	
[Vol. 46:83
has spent much time in front of an Internet-connected computer can
attest, it is often far too easy to find distractions online.I 65
 Not surpris-
ingly, an entire industry has sprung up to help employers monitor their
employees' use of these work computers. 166 Employers can now pur-
chase software that allows them to record every keystroke their employ-
ees make, view anything that has appeared on their employees' screens,
and maintain a copy of every e-mail their employees send and receive
from their computers. 167
Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that employers are
taking full advantage of these surveillance technology options. For ex-
ample, a recent report by the American Management Association
found that nearly half of private firms monitor their employees' e-mail,
and 62.8% monitor their employees' Internet connections. 168 Of the
companies surveyed, 77.7% monitored their employees' telecommu-
nications, and 27% had dismissed an employee based at least in part
on information obtained from such monitoring. 169 Of course, work-
place surveillance is not limited to the monitoring of employees' work
workers, nearly 40,000,000 were regular users of the Internet and e-mail at work. Andrew
Schulman, Privacy Found., The Extent of Systematic Monitoring of Employee E-mail and Internet
Use, at hup://www.sonic.net/—undoc/extent.htm (July 9, 2001) (quoting figures from the
U.S. Department of Labor).
165 See, e.g., Ian Ayers, Lectures it Laptops, N.1' TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at A25 (stating that
the distractions of the Internet are so great that the author has instilled filtering software
on his office computer to limit his own use of the Internet while at work).
166 See, e.g., Boehmer, supra note 160, at 739 (opining that "[tihe vast arsenal of tech-
nology now available to employers for the day-to-day gathering and analysis of information
about their employees is impressive, as well as frightening"); Dan McIntosh, e-mon-
itoringdworkplace.com: The Future of Contmunication Privacy in the Minnesota Private -Sector Work-
place, 23 HAMLINE L. REV, 539, 541 (2000) (explaining that Iaiccompanying the growing
use of ... new business tools is the development of equally advanced means of allowing
employers to electronically monitor their use by employees").
167 For example, SpectorSoft, a software company, offers a product on its website that
will perform all of these functions. See firm-I-016°Fr, Spector Pro 5.0, at http://www.spec
torsoft.com/ prod uc ts/ SpectorPro Windows/ index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) (pledg-
ing that their software "Records Every Exact Detail of Their PC and Internet Activity"); see
also Karen J. Barnum, Watching You, Watching Me, PC MAG., July 2002, at 100-04 (describing
and reviewing a number of products that perform essentially the same functions).
168 AM. MGMT. Ass'N, 2001 AMA SURVEY, 'WORKPLACE AND MONITORING SURVEILLANCE:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 1 (2001), available at hup://www.arnanet.org/researchipdfs/
ems_short2001.01.
169 Id. at 1-2; see also Elise M. Bloom et al., Competing Interests in the Post 9-11 Workplace:
The New Line Between Privacy and Safety, 29 WM. MiTcHELL L. REV, 897, 898 (2003) (explain-
ing that "[s] ince September 11 [20011, sales of Internet and e-mail monitoring software
have risen dramatically").
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,computers.'" Currently, more employees than ever are being drug-
tested, 171 having their phone conversations tape recorded,'" and hav-
ing their work activities videotaped.'" If the previous Part of this Arti-
cle was correct, then this expansion of employee surveillance in the
workplace should correspond to a diminished expectation of privacy
in the workplace for Fourth Amendment purposes. As the next section
will demonstrate, the cases reported in this area indicate exactly that.
2. Fourth Amendment Implications
Federal law does little to explicitly regulate employer surveillance
of employees. For example, although the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 (the "ECPA") prevents the interception and moni-
toring of electronic communications by private individuals,'" almost
all employer monitoring of employees is likely exempted from this leg-
islation.'" Furthermore, although many states have passed laws that
reinforce the protections of the ECPA,'" in most cases, the greatest
I70 See generally S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee Mani-
toting in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REv. 825, 826 n.5 (1998) (cataloguing lower court cases in-
volving polygraph testing, psychological profiling, drug testing, and physical searching of
employees).
171 See, e.g., AM. CIVIL Liatarms UNION, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: WORKPLACE DRUG TEs - r-
ING, at http://www.achtorg/WorkplaceRights/WorkplaceRights.cfm/lll=9925&c=34  (Mar.
12, 2002) (reporting that between 1987 and 2002 drug testing of employees went up 277%).
172 see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Seglin, As Office Snooping Grows, Who Watches the Watchers?, N.Y.
TIMES , Jun. 1 8, 2000, § 3, at 4 (reporting that the monitoring of employees' work phones is
widespread and that leixcept for the shouting, it is becoming clear that the debate over
employee privacy is over").
175 AM. MGM'. ASS'N, Supra note 168, at 1.
174
 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000) (prohibiting the interception or disclosure of any transfer
of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photooptical system
that affects interstate or foreign commerce").
175 See, e.g., McIntosh, supra note 166, at 549 (describing the Business Use, Consent and
Provider exceptions to the ECPA and stating that "the exceptions have been applied favora-
bly to employers and thus, have posed significant hurdles to employee claims under the
ECPA that allege unlawful interception or access of workplace conununications"). Similarly,
the Federal Wiretap Act has been held not to prohibit employer interception of e-nriils and
monitoring of web traffic, at least so long as the interception is of stored data rather than
data in transit. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 458
(5th Cir, 1994); Philip L. Gordon, Job Insecurity? Wizen It Comes to Workplace Surveillance of
Electronic Communications, Employers Are Free to Establish the Rules of the Game, 79 DENY. U. L.
REV. 513, 513 (2002) (discussing how judicial interpretation of the Federal Wiretap Act
essentially eliminates statutory protection for workplace Internet and e•nail use).
176 Given that the federal law preempts inconsistent state laws, the only way states can
avoid having their statutes preempted by ECPA is to provide identical or greater protection
than is provided by federal law. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 21 n.1 (1st
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restraint on workplace surveillance is the employer's own statement of
what it will and will not do. 177
 Although an employer may not snoop
upon its employees if it has promised or contracted not to do so, an
employer who informs workers that their activities are subject to sur-
veillance will likely have a free hand in conducting that surveillance. 178
Under Katz, law enforcement officials conduct a search when they
invade an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. 179 In the
workplace context, the determination of whether the employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy has often involved an analysis of
whether the individual was able to protect the area in question from
others180—whether the employee had the capacity to lock files, to ex-
clude others from the employee's work space, and so on. 181 Of course,
evidence that a person's employer has engaged in exactly the sort of
Cir. 1983) (finding that a state wiretap statute must provide greater protection than the
federal statute in order to avoid being preempted).
177 See, e.g., Jeffrey Benner, Privacy at Work? Be Serious, WIRED NEws, at http://www.
wired.com/news/business/0,1367,42029,00.html  (Mar. 1, 2001). In an article for Wired
News, Jeffrey Benner stated the following:
[']fan employee is led to expect something is private, such as e-mail commu-
nications, then that privacy cannot be violated. But, if the company informs
its employees that, for example, e-mail sent over the company's network is
monitored, then the employee can no longer claim an 'expectation of pri-
vacy." In short, once the company stakes its claim over its cyber-dominion, its
employees have no right to privacy there.
Id.
178
 Furthermore, even if legislation were passed regulating the extent to which em-
ployers monitor their employees, such legislation would likely only be a default rule, one
that employers, with their generally superior bargaining power, would almost certainly be
able to bargain around. See, e.g., Lee Kovarsky, Tolls on the Information Superhighway: Entitle-
ment Defaults for Clickstream Data, 89 VA. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (2003) ("That employers may
monitor e-mail and web surfing to promote productivity and protect against industrial
espionage has become more of a fact of life than a controversy, and employers would likely
contract around any default rule to the contrary.") (citation omitted). It is difficult to
imagine a regime in which employers were completely forbidden from engaging in this
type of surveillance, even with the consent of their employees.
178 See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
m See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-15, 722 (1987) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment can be implicated by a public employer's search of an employee's
workplace, but that when the search is conducted by a public employer for a work-related
reason, neither a warrant nor probable cause is required).
181 See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding
that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those private effects he
brought to the office where he kept his office door closed and his window covered);
United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 673 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding "a privacy interest in an
office reserved for one's exclusive use at a place of employment to be reasonable, espe-
cially when asserted against a forcible entry after work hours").
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surveillance that the government is later attempting to conduct—
whether it be the reading of e-mails, the searching of hard drives, or
the tracking of web traffic—generally makes it very difficult for an em-
ployee to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace,
For example, in Mulch v. Glenayre Electronics, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that a private employee did not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a computer given to him by his em-
ployer for work purposes. 182 At the request of federal law enforcement
officials who suspected Albert Muick of possessing child pornogra-
phy, 183 Muick's employer seized his work computer until a warrant
could be issued for its contents. 184
 A subsequent warranted search of
the computer revealed the presence of child pornography, and Muick
was convicted of violating federal laws forbidding the possession of
such material.P35
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that because Muick had
been told that his computer remained the employer's property and
that the employer had explicitly reserved the right to examine its con-
tents at any time and without notice, it was unreasonable for him to
have an expectation of privacy in the information stored on that
computer—"[The employer] had announced that it could inspect the
laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees, and this de-
stroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy that Muick might have
182 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, j.).
153 Interestingly, a very large percentage of the reported cases in this area involve
computer searches for child pornography. In his book on the loss of privacy in the modern
era, Jeffrey Rosen critiques the expansion of gender discrimination law as contributing to a
general decrease in privacy in the work place:
Most Americans ... will never be deposed in a sexual harassment suit, either
as a plaintiff, a defendant, or a witness. Nevertheless, many Americans have
their e-mail or Internet browsing habits monitored at work, and one of the
most common justifications of employee monitoring offered by courts and
management lawyers is die fear of liability for sexual harassment.
See ROSEN, supra note 150, at 12. My review of cases involving criminal prosecutions that
follow workplace searches, however, reveals that they nearly uniformly involve searches for
child pornography. Although Rosen may be correct about the majority of employer sur-
veillance, when law enforcement officials search a worksite, it is almost always to search for
child pornography. In a later article, I hope to explore further this relationship between
substantive criminal law and the issues that new criminal statutes will raise in the realm of
criminal procedure.
184
 Surprisingly, the court found that the employer was not a state actor although it
seized the computer at the government's request. Muick, 280 F.3d at 742-,-43. Nonetheless,
the court went on to consider the Fourth Amendment implications of the seizure. Id. at 743.
185 Id. at 742.
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had and so scotches his claim." 8° Although most reported federal
cases involving workplace searches have involved job-related searches
by public employers, 187
 the handful of cases involving searches of pri-
vate work spaces by law enforcement officials have largely been re-
solved in the same way as Muick.m
In brief, these cases reveal that the increased capacity of employers
to surveil their employees has, in fact, led directly to a decreased expec-
tation of privacy vis-a-vis the government. Employees who are subject to
private surveillance in the workplace are generally defenseless when
the government seeks to collect data from their workplace as well.
B. Commercial Information Misuse
There are many laudable reasons to allow retailers to collect and
even share information about those with whom they do business.m 9
186 Id, at 743.
In See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398, 400 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying the
O'Connor exception to the warrant requirement to a search by CIA administrators of an
employee's computer, notwithstanding the fact that the administrators conducted the
search to acquire evidence of criminal activity"); see United States v Slanina, 283 F.3d 670,
678 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Slanina v. United States, 537 U.S. 802
(2002) (following Simons and finding that "O'Connor's goal of ensuring an efficient work-
place should not be frustrated simply because the same misconduct that violates a govern-
ment employer's policy also happens to be illegal"); United States v. Fernandes, 272 F.3d
938, 942-43 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding the otonnorstandard applicable to a post-firing search
of a prosecutor's office); see also Taffeta, 923 F.2d at 673-75 (holding that an initial search of
a law enforcement officer's office was subject to the O'Connor exception to the warrant re-
quirement, but that a subsequent, unwarranted videotaping of that office was not).
lea See, e.g., United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1132, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002)
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in a college professor's work computer when
the university had a written computer policy stating that it reserved the right to "view or
scan any file or software stored on the computer or passing through the network, and will
do so periodically"); see also Dir. of Thrift Supervision v. Ernst & Young, 795 F. Stipp. 7, 10
(D.D.C. 1992) (holding that employees and partners of private accounting firm have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in work-related diaries kept in their offices for business
purposes). In United States v. Bailey, the United States District Court, Nebraska, stated that
the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in the work computer owned by someone else be-
cause every time he accessed the work computer he physically acknowledged
that he was giving consent to search the computer. Such repeated warnings
about consent to search, followed by such repeated acknowledgments, cate-
gorically and without more defeat Bailey's claim of privacy.
272 F. Stipp. 2d 822, 824 (D. Neb. 2003).
183 For a more detailed analysis of the benefits of information sharing, see generally
THE FIN, SERVS, ROUNDTABLE, CUSTOMER BENEFITS FROM CURRENT INFORMATION SHAR-
ING BY FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANIES (2000), available at http://www.netcaucus.org/
books/privacy2001 /pdf/ernstyoungreport.pdf.
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For example, Amazon.com, the online retailer that I use most often,
knows a lot about me. It knows what books, compact discs, and cloth-
ing I have purchased. It can probably conclude from my late interest
in infant clothing that I have recently had a child. It knows what items
I have considered buying based on what I have placed in my virtual
shopping cart but not actually purchased. Allowing Amazon.com
 to
collect and analyze this information can be a very good thing. If I
have purchased two compact discs from a particular artist in the past,
I might want to know that the artist has recently released a new al-
bum. I might also want to know that people who enjoy the band
whose compact discs I have purchased seem to like another band's
releases as well. Similarly, I might want to be alerted to sales on mer-
chandise I have perused in the past but not purchased. If I am bound
to be targeted by online retailers, and I am, it would be nice if that
advertising could be relevant to my previously expressed preferences.
Of course, there is also a downside to Amazon.com
 having this
information about me. It could choose to share this information with
others without my permission. It could reveal it to the public either
accidentally or in order to embarrass me. Its employees could misuse
my private information for their own purposes. All of these risks
prompted Scott McNealy, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, to infa-
mously remark when queried about his company's privacy policy, "You
already have zero privacy—get over it."1 "
1. State of the Art
Many of the concerns regarding the misuse of consumer infor-
mation involve the enormous databases of information that retailers
and advertisers are able to compile. 191
 Perhaps the most well-known
case of purported commercial information misuse was the Double-
Click incident of 1999. 192
 DoubleClick, a direct marketer that pro-
10 John Markoff, Growing Compatibility Issue: Computers and User Privacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1999, at Al.
191
 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to
Consumer Data Profiling, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 63, 65 (2003) ("Both on- and offline, businesses
are collecting and warehousing staggering amounts of personal information about Ameri-
can citizens and compiling it into electronic dossiers designed to predict the way people
think and behave. More than 1000 data•mining companies collect and sell data about U.S.
consumers.").
192
 See, e.g., In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Stipp. 2d 497, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). For a discussion of the facts of the case, see Stan Rants, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 393, 439-43 (2002). See generally Amy S. Weinberg, These Cookies Won't Cruet-
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vided advertisements for websites, compiled browsing information on
more than one hundred million web users. 193 When DoubleClick ac-
quired a company that gathered information on individuals' offline
purchasing trends, it announced that it would be combining its two
databases in a way that might make it possible to identify, by name,
the buying and surfing habits of individuals included in both data-
bases. 194
 Although a consolidated lawsuit challenging the company's
plans was eventually dismissed for failure to state a claim, 195 negative
publicity forced DoubleClick to curtail its plans.I 96
The desire of advertisers to obtain, store, and mine demographic
information on potential customers was hardly extinguished, however,
with the public firestorm that surrounded the DoubleClick case. Di-
rected advertising remains the dream of those who advertise online.
For example, the New York Times's website recently announced that it
would allow advertisers to reach its readers based on the type of story
those readers most often accessed. 197
 So, for example, a sporting
goods manufacturer might be interested in advertising to those read-
ers who had clicked on three or more sports articles in a given period
of time. 198
 There is little reason to think that negative publicity alone
ble—Yet: The Corporate Monitoring of Consumer Internet Activity, In Re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy
Litigation, 154 E Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), 21 TEMP. ENV n.. L. Sc TECH. J. 33 (2002).
199 DoubleClich Unveils an Initiative to Protect Users' Online Privacy, WALL. Si.'' J., Feb. 15,
2000, at 136.
' 94 Andrea Petersen, A Privacy Firestorm at Don bleClick:
	 Highflier's Executives Blinded by
a Backlash. Are Scrambling to Recover, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2000, at B1 (explaining that
"[w]hat makes privacy advocates so crazy is that a combined DoubleClick-Abacus database
can now connect Web sites someone visits with that person's real name and address").
199
 The plaintiffs in the DoubleClick litigation brought their claims under the following
three acts: the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-
2711 (2000), the Wiretap Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000), and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000). In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig.,
154 F. Supp. 2d, at 500. All three of the claims were dismissed by the federal district court,
and the parties reached a settlement agreement prior to plaintiffs' appeal of that ruling.
Id. See generally Weinberg, supra note 192.
196
 Andrea Petersen, DoubleClick Reverses Course After Privacy Outcry, WALL Si. J., Mar. 3,
2000, at BI (explaining that "[i]n a stunning about-face, online advertising firm Double-
Click Inc. says it will not connect people's names, addresses and other personal informa-
tion with the data it collects about where they go on the Web, at least until government
and industry set privacy standard?).
197 Stefanie Olsen, NYTimes.com
 Gears Ads to Surfers' Habits, at http://news.com.com/
NYFimes.com+gears+ads+to+surfers+habits/2100-1023_3-984575.htnal (Feb. 13, 2003)
(explaining that "[t]he theory [behind targeted advertising] is that if marketers can match
their products to already-interested parties ... then everybody win?).
198 See id.
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will be sufficient to slow this trend toward data accumulation and tar-
geted advertising in the near future.
2. Fourth Amendment Implications
Currently, consumers are protected against the misuse of their
information mainly by the negative publicity surrounding the misuse
of this information. ]" Federal law governs this area only tangentially
and in some cases actually facilitates the sharing and selling of this
information. 200 Just as the greatest restraint on what employers may
do in the employment context is the employer's own promises on that
point, so in the e-commerce area, one of the greatest constraints on
how an electronic retailer may gather and share the information it
gathers is the company's own stated privacy policy. For example, when
Northwest Airlines revealed earlier last year that it had given the Na-
tional Aeronautic and Space Administration data on as many as ten
million passengers, one of the Airline's principal defenses was that it
had not violated its own privacy policy. 201 Distinguishing itself from
JetBlue Airways, which had earlier admitted to violating its own pri-
vacy policy, Northwest officials defended their actions by arguing that
they had given the information directly to a government agency that
had an obligation to safeguard that information and that such disclo-
sure was not inconsistent with its stated policies. 202
Furthermore, it is difficult to see why courts will not. treat the in-
formation compiled on consumers by retailers, advertisers, and direct
marketers, both online and elsewhere, like they treated the banking
and phone records in Miller and Smith, respectively.203 Because con-
sumer information has been conveyed willingly to a third party—be-
cause you know that your online retailer maintains these records, for
199 For example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 allows companies to share con-
sumer information with affiliated entities, and to share it with unaffiliated entities unless
consumers opt out of the Act's provisions. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified in relevant part at 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000)). See McClurg, supra note 191, at 133—
37.
200 See McClurg, supra note 191, at 133-37.
201 See Matthew L. Wald, Airline Gave Government Information on Passengers, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2004, § 1, at 16.
202 See Airline Addresses Data-Sharing Denials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2004, at A10.
20$ See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Pri-
vacy, 75 S. CAI„ L. Ity.v. 1083, 1141 (2002) (explaining that "k]ommunications service
providers frequently store their customers' communications. These probably fall under the
third-party record rule of Smith v. Maryland and 'United States v. Miller because third parties
maintain the information.") (citations omitted).
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example—it is very unlikely that the government will be held to in-
vade a reasonable expectation of privacy when it attempts to access
these records. 204 If anything, there is likely to be less protection for
consumer information than for the arguably more sensitive informa-
tion regarding one's phone calls and finances.
Thus far, there has been a relative dearth of reported cases in-
volving the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to information
collected by commercial entities. In fact, all of the reported cases in
this area have dealt with privacy interests in the context of an Internet
service provider ("ISP" ).205 Furthermore, in each case the court con-
cluded that there is no expectation of privacy in information one
shares with an ISP. For example, in United States v. Hambrick, 2°6 a Vir-
ginia district court held that individuals have no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in information they have freely chosen to share with
their ISPs:
[W]lien Mr. Hambrick entered into an agreement to obtain
Internet access from MindSpring, he knowingly revealed his
name, address, credit card number, and telephone number
to MindSpring and its employees. Mr. Hambrick also se-
lected [his] screen name.... When the defendant selected
his screen name it became tied to his true identity in all
MindSpring records. MindSpring employees had ready ac-
cess to these records in the normal course of MindSpring's
business, for example, in the keeping of its records for bill-
ing purposes, and nothing prevented MindSpring from re-
2" This concern is neither merely hypothetical nor limited to the online context. A
relatively well-known example comes from my home state of Colorado. See Tattered Cover,
Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1063 (Colo. 2002). During a raid on a drug lab,
officers found two books on the making of methamphetamine along with a mailing enve-
lope from a local bookstore. Id. at 1048. Utilizing first a subpoena and then a search war-
rant, law enforcement officials attempted to obtain evidence of what books were sent to
the house and to whom. Id. at 1049. The bookstore fought the requests, and the Colorado
Supreme Court ultimately decided that the requests for the information violated the First
Amendment rights of the store's clients. Id. at 1063.
205 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (A) (2000) ("[Tlhe term 'service provider' means an en-
tity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user's
choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received.") (emphasis
added); Monica Vir, Note, The Blame Game: Can Internet Service Providers Escape Liability for
Semantic Attacks?, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. U. 193, 193 n.1 {2003) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) {A)) (indicating that "[eIxamples of Internet service providers include
America Online ('AOL') and CompuServe").
2°6 55 F. Stipp. 2d 504, 508-09 (W.D. Va. 1999).
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vealing this information to nongovernmental actors. Also,
there is nothing in the record to suggest that there was a re-
strictive agreement between the defendant and MindSpring
that would limit the right of MindSpring to reveal the de-
fendant's personal information to nongovernmental entities.
Where such dissemination of information to nongovern-
ment entities is not prohibited, there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in that information. 207
Just as Miller waived an expectation of privacy in his personal data by
sharing it with his bank, so Hambrick waived any expectation of pri-
vacy in his personal information by sharing it with his ISP. 208 To date,
each of the courts that has considered the question has ruled the
same way.209
Furthermore, each time the issue has arisen, the courts have held
that the existence and possible violation of a relevant federal statute—
either the ECPA or the Cable Communications Policy Act (the
"CCPA")—neither created a reasonable expectation of privacy nor
required suppression as a remedy. For example, in Hambrick, the
Court found the following:
Although Congress is willing to recognize that individuals
have some degree of privacy in the stored data and transac-
tional records that their ISPs retain, the ECPA is hardly a leg-
islative determination that this expectation of privacy is one
that rises to the level of "reasonably objective" for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Despite its concern for privacy, Con-
gress did not provide for suppression where a party obtains
stored data or transactional records in violation of the Act.
Additionally, the ECPA's concern for privacy extends only to
government invasions of privacy. ISPs are free to turn stored
data and transactional records over to nongovernmental en-
207 Id.
2°9 See id.
209 See United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing Cali-
fornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); Katz v. United Slates, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967); and Smith, 42 U.S. at 743-44) ("When defendant entered into an agreement with
Road Runner for Internet service, he knowing revealed all information connected to [his]
IP address.... He cannot now claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his
subscriber information."); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1110) (reaching the same conclusion); see also Gavin
Skok, Establishing a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy in Clichstream Data, 6 Muni. Turcomm.
&Thcli. L. REV. 61, 73 n.48 (2000) (collecting cases).
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Cities. For Fourth Amendment purposes, this court does not
find that the ECPA has legislatively determined that an indi-
vidual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his name,
address, social security number, credit card number, and
proof of Internet connection. The fact that the ECPA does
not proscribe turning over such information to private enti-
ties buttresses the conclusion that the ECPA does not create
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information.20
Haminick and the cases decided along similar lines demonstrate that
the courts will afford little protection to information disseminated for
commercial purposes. Even if that information is disclosed to a single
entity for a narrow purpose, even if that information is protected by a
privacy statute if accessed by a private actor, and even if the govern-
ment conduct in question would violate that statute, the courts are
unlikely to find a reasonable expectation of privacy.
C. Medical Information
The information we share with our medical professionals reveals
the most intimate details of our lives. 211 Our private habits both legal
and illegal, sexual practices, family characteristics, and psychological
history can all be relevant to medical treatment. We reveal things to our
doctors that we might not reveal to our spouses, families, or friends,
210 55 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citation omitted); see Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1i11. In
United Stares v. Kennedy, the United States District Court held the following:
This court need not decide whether the [Cable Communication Policy
Act] was violated in the instant action because even if it were, defendant still
would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence as a remedy for the vio-
lation. As with the ECPA, the CCPA speaks nothing of an exclusionary rem-
edy, only a civil remedy.
81 F. Stipp. 2d at 1111.
Interestingly, it is not at all clear what the result would be if Congress in fact had de-
cided, as part of a regulatory regime, that a particular class of data or information is enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protections. This conclusion would, ostensibly, be an interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment, an interpretation the Supreme Court would not be
required to validate. For example, the Supreme Court has rejected Congress's conclusions
regarding when conduct substantially impacts interstate or foreign commerce. See United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995). Similarly, the Court might reject Congress's
conclusion that a particular expectation of privacy is reasonable. See id.
21t
	 e.g., Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECII.
283, 302 (2003) ("Medical information is almost always sensitive. Having the world
learn about one's Prozac prescription can be embarrassing; having the world learn about
one's HIV-positive status can be life-shattering.").
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and that we certainly do not want our employers, neighbors, insurance
companies, or law enforcement officials to become aware of. Because
of its sensitivity, the wrongful or careless disclosure of medical informa-
tion strikes a very resonant chord with those concerned about their pri-
vacy.
There is mounting evidence that information shared with health
care providers and insurers is being sought and obtained by private
entities that have no legitimate interest in its use. The Health Privacy
Project, a research institute associated with Georgetown University,
lists some egregious recent examples on its website:
Terri Seargent, a North Carolina resident, was fired from
her job after being diagnosed with a genetic disorder that
required expensive treatment.... [S] he suspected that her
employer, who is self-insured, found out about her condi-
tion, and fired her to avoid the projected expenses.
An Atlanta truck driver lost his job in early 1998 after his
employer learned from his insurance company that he had
sought treatment for a drinking problem.
Joan Kelly was automatically enrolled in a "depression pro-
gram" by her employer, Motorola, after her prescription drugs
management company reported that she was taking anti-
depressan ts.212
1. State of the Art
Like the misuse of commercial information, one of the main
threats to medical privacy is the maintenance of large databases of in-
formation.2" When a patient's file was a physical object that remained
212 1'IEAI:111 PRIVACY PROJECT, MEDICAL PRIVACY STORIES 1 (2003), available at
http://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/storiesupd.pdf
 (last updated Nov. 10, 2003) (cita-
tions omitted). Professor Paul M. Schwartz stated the following:
In the United States approximately 140 million people, or nearly two-thirds of
the population under sixty-five, receive medical benefits through their job.
Because these benefits are an increasingly costly part of the overall package of
compensation, employers have a great incentive to weed out workers with ex-
pensive health care needs.
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Econernics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEL L.
REV. 1, 26 (1997) (citations omitted).
219 See, e.g., DeVries, supra nate 211, at 302 (explaining that "[w]hile digital technology
can save money and allow life-saving medical information to he instantly sent between
132	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 46:83
in the doctor's office, the possibility of prying eyes discovering its con-
tents was relatively low, and the risks of widespread disclosure were al-
most non-existent. 214 As the information conveyed to doctors increas-
ingly becomes stored electronically and aggregated with others'
information, however, the possibilities of misuse multiply almost expo-
nen tially." 5
Despite these risks, there are also great benefits to aggregating
and digitalizing medical information. These processes make possible
the sharing of medical information between different healthcare pro-
viders virtually instantaneously, thereby facilitating the delivery of
medical care wherever the patient seeks it.216 Furthermore, extensive
databases of medical information may allow medical research to be
conducted in ways unimaginable before widespread information sitar-
hospitals and doctors, the same technology also heightens the possibility of mistake or
misuse"),
214 But see HEAurtiv PRIVACY PROJECT, supra note 212, at 4-5 (containing examples of
disclosure of medical records based on misplaced or lost physical files).
216 See, e.g., DeVries, supra note 211, at 307-08 (arguing that "[t]he underlying prob-
lem of informational privacy in the digital age is the ability to access and aggregate vast
amounts of otherwise harmless personal data into a form that can do real damage to the
individual's sense of self-determination and autonomy"). Professor Julie E. Cohen stated
the following:
Collections of information about, and identified to, individuals have ex-
isted for decades. The rise of a networked society, however, has brought with
it intense concern about the personal and social implications of such data-
bases—now, in digital form, capable of being rapidly searched, instantly dis-
tributed, and seamlessly combined with other data sources to generate ever
more comprehensive records of individual attributes and activities.
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373,1374 (2000).
216 See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, Medical Records and IIIPAA: Is It Too Late to Protect Pri-
vacy?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1497,1501 (2002). Professor Peter D. Jacobson offered the follow-
ing explanation:
[S] haring [medical information] among medical professionals may be crucial
for monitoring the quality of care and for maintaining continuity of care. For
example, physicians and pharmacists must have accurate data on all pharma-
ceuticals a patient takes to prevent adverse drug-drug interactions. The
American Hospital Association (AHA) argues that health professionals need a
full picture of the patient's health, not a small amount of information about
one specific condition, to avoid complications.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Schwartz, supra note 212, at 53 (arguing that "Wile multi-
functional patient record has the potential to heighten the efficiency of the health care
business. It also is capable of leading to improvements in medical science.").
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ing became possible. 217 Like the databases of consumer information
discussed in the previous section, therefore, the problem is not with
the information's aggregation and use per se, but rather with the
enormous potential for misuse that coincides with it.
2. Fourth Amendment Implications
Federal law now expressly regulates medical information privacy;
HIPAA became effective on April 14, 2003. 218 HIPAA creates Privacy
and Security Rules applicable to "protected health information" held
or transmitted by covered entities and their affiliated businesses. 219
HIPAA's coverage is both extensive 220
 and strict—unless an exception
to the privacy provisions applies, "a covered entity may not use or dis-
close protected health information."221
Prior to the passäge of HIPAA there was a wide split of authority
in both the state222 and federa1 223 courts regarding whether or not in-
217
 See, c.g., Jacobson, supra note 216, at 1501-02 (arguing that a positive use of medical
information databases can be the facilitation of medical research).
219 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of chapters 26, 29, and 42 of the United States Code). For a good summary of the
law's provisions, see generally U.S. DEP'T or FIEAurit & HUMAN SERV., SUMMARY OE THE
H1PAA PRIVACY RULE (2003), available at hair/ / wwwiths .gov / ocr / privacystiminary.pdf
(last revised May2003).
The Supreme Court has long implied that the right to privacy it identified in Roe a Wade
and Griswold v. Connecticut governs medical information and decision making. See Whalen v
Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599.-600 (1977) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); and Griswold, 381
U.S. 479,484 (1965)) (concluding that the state statute at issue was not sufficiently invasive to
infringe on a right the plaintiff might have to medical information privacy).
219 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2004).
229 The Act provides a federal floor for the protection of medical privacy. States remain
free to provide greater protections. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2003); see also Nat'l Abortion
Fed'n v. Ashcroft, No. 04 C 55, 2004 WL 292079, at *2-3 (N.D. III. Feb. 6, 2004) (finding
that subpoenas issued in a federal action may be quashed under Illinois privacy law,
though they would be permitted under HIPAA).
221 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (a) (2003).
222 Compare Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa. 1994) (finding a reason-
able expectation of privacy in medical information), with People v. Perlos, 462 N.W.2d 310,
316 (Mich. 1990) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in medical information),
Tints v. State, 711 So.2d 1118, 1122 (Ala. Crirn. App. 1997) (finding no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in medical information), and State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370, 375-76
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1082 (1984) (finding no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in medical information).
229 Compare F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in medical records), and United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that "Where can be no question that an em-
ployee's medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well
within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection"), with Webb v. Goldstein, 117
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dividuals had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their medical in-
formation, particularly in information that was held by third-parties.
For example, in the Rhode Island case of State v. Guido,224 the defen-
dant was involved in a serious car accident and was taken to a hospital
where his blood was drawn pursuant to normal hospital protocols. 225
Three days later a subpoena duces tecum was requested and issued for
defendant's medical records from the hosphaL226 The records were
turned over to the authorities and indicated that the defendant's
blood alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit at the time he
was admitted to the hospital; the defendant was subsequently indicted
for driving under the influence with serious bodily injury resulting.227
Both prior to trial and following his conviction, Salvatore Guido
challenged the introduction of medical records to indicate that he
was intoxicated. 228 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction, analogizing the medical records to the bank-
ing records at issue in Millen
In this case we conclude that defendant had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the medical records. We reach this
conclusion largely on the basis that these records were pro-
duced by medical personnel for their use in providing medi-
cal treatment. These were not defendant's personal papers
created or kept by him. The defendant can demonstrate nei-
ther ownership nor possession. For those reasons the records
here more closely resemble the telephone records lawfully
subpoenaed in State v. McGoff, or the bank records subpoe-
naed in United States v. Miller. 229
In State v. Hardy, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals came to
the same conclusion in a lengthy opinion reciting similar facts. 23° The
F. Stipp. 2d 289, 295-96 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy on
the part of a parolee in medical records released in connection with a rape investigation).
224 698 A.2d 729, 734 (R.I. 1997).
223 Id. at 732.
22° Id.
227 Id.
22° Id. at 732-33.
229 Guido, 698 A.2d at 734 (citations omitted). In State v. MeGoff, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court analogized to United States v. Miller in finding that no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in records maintained by one's telephone company. 517 A.2d 232, 234,
(R.I. 1986).
23° 963 S.W.2d 516, 525-26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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Texas court, however, found United States v. JacobsenM to be more
analogous than Miller
A subpoena for blood alcohol and drug information about
the driver in an automobile accident is somewhat analogous
to the chemical test in Jacobsen. A subpoena directed solely at
blood alcohol and drug tests would, like the chemical test in
Jacobsen, be a very narrow investigatory method designed to
elicit evidence for a very narrow purpose. 232
Other courts, in different contexts, have found a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in medical information, particularly when medi-
cal records are searched or seized as part of a broad investigation
conducted without probable cause. For example, in Doe v. BroderiCk,233
the Fourth Circuit was confronted with a search of the records of a
methadone clinic as part of an investigation of a nearby armed rob-
bery.234 One of the clinic's patients subsequently brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the search of the clinic violated his
Fourth Amendment rights."' The Fourth Circuit found that there was
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records, although they were
maintained by a third party:
There is no question that. Doe maintained a genuine subjec-
tive expectation of privacy in his records and files kept at the
methadone clinic. The more interesting issue is whether a pa-
tient's expectation of privacy—Doe's expectation of privacy—
in his treatment records and files maintained by a substance
abuse treatment center is one that society is willing to recog-
nize as objectively reasonable and thus comes within ambit of
the Fourth Amendment's protections. We think it iS.236
The court distinguished Miller on the ground that the Supreme
Court's decision in that case was influenced by the Bank Secrecy Act
231 466 U.S. 109,119-21 (1984); see supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
232 Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 525-26. In Commonwealth v. Riedel, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court came to a slightly different conclusion. See 651 A.2d at 141. Finding that there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records, the court concluded that a search of
those records was not unreasonable when a police officer merely wrote to the hospital to
request those records rather than relying on a subpoena to obtain them. Id.
233 225 F.3d 440,450 (4th Cir. 2000).
234 Id. at 444.
233 Id. at 445.
236
 Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
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which required the hank to keep and maintain certain records. 237
"The relevant statute here . . . does quite the opposite, making access
to the records more difficult for criminal investigation purposes. Un-
der these circumstances, we think that the statute is a fitting indica-
tion that society is willing to recognize Doe's expectation of privacy as
objectively reasonable."239 Thus, although the court had been unwill-
ing to find that the existence of a federal statute forbidding the dis-
semination of drug treatment information created a cause of action
under § 1983, the court was willing to consider the statute's existence
as relevant in determining whether or not a reasonable expectation of
privacy existed in the drug treatment records. 239
The implementation of HIPAA is unlikely to change this legal
landscape significantly. In the Justice Department abortion subpoena
case discussed in the Introduction, 240 the federal judge who ordered
the subpoena quashed under Illinois law found that the subpoenas
comported with HIPAA's provision for the release of medical records
"in the course of any judicial or administrative proceeding ... in re-
sponse to an order of the court."241 Thus, once again, the mere exis-
tence of a statute regulating or even punishing the disclosure of sensi-
tive information was held insufficient to prohibit the government
from acquiring that information in a criminal proceeding. Particu-
larly when express provision is made for the use of sensitive material
in a legal proceeding, courts are very unlikely to find that such disclo-
sure violates the Constitution.
237 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (2000).
238 Broderick, 225 F.3d at 450 (citation omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 290dd(2) (2000)).
The statute at issue prohibits, in most circumstances, the disclosure of "[r]ecords of the
identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment of any patient which are maintained in connec-
tion with the performance of any program or activity relating to substance abuse educa-
tion, prevention, training, treatment, rehabilitation, or research." 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a).
The statute also states that unless an exception applies, "no record referred to in subsec-
tion (a) of this section may be used to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against
a patient or to conduct any investigation of a patient." Id. § 290dd-2(c). Finally, the statute
provides for criminal penalties for anyone violating its provisions. Id. § 290dd-2(f).
239 Sec Valdez, 58 F.3d at 1535 (noting that defendants in a § 1983 action concede that
plaintiffs have a reasonable expectation of privacy in medical records kept by a psychiatrist
where that psychiatrist's office is searched in a Medicaid fraud investigation); United States
v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1310 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding on similar
facts that patients "have a privacy interest" in their medical records but that the search and
seizure of them on the facts presented was reasonable).
240 See supra notes 1-18 and accompanying text.
241 Nat'l Abortion Fed'a, 2004 WL 292079, at *2 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)
(2003)).
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D. Summary
As I stated at the outset of this Part, my goal was not to catalogue
systematically the myriad ways in which individuals are under surveil-
lance in the United States today—given recent events and develop-
ments, such an analysis would be virtually impossible in any single ar-
ticle."2 Rather, this Part was meant to highlight some of the most
serious threats to individual privacy posed not by government actors
but by private actors. It is clear that private surveillance, information
sharing, and information acquisition are widespread and growing,
and that technological innovation will only accelerate the capacity of
private actors to gain access to our "private" information.
Technological development in each of these areas is neither an
unmitigated good nor an unmitigated evil, however. As the benefits
and costs of digitization, aggregation, data-mining, and the like are
evaluated, one factor that is often excluded from the calculus is the
unconscious externality of increased government surveillance. As
even this brief selection of topics and cases makes clear, courts are
considering the pervasiveness of private intrusions when determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, and they often use
those private invasions to validate invasive governmental conduct.
N. How TO INCREASE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS
In this Part, my focus moves briefly from the descriptive and ana-
lytical to the prescriptive. I argue that if the discussion above is accu-
rate, increased privacy protections will come in one of the following
three ways: the Supreme Court will abandon its adherence to an as-
sumption-of-risk reading of the Fourth Amendment, thereby de-
linking private and governmental conduct; civil privacy protections will
be extended to cover more people and to offer greater protections,
resulting in fewer and fewer non-governmental intrusions on privacy;
or individuals will begin to take practical steps to protect themselves
from invasions of privacy, making it more difficult for any actor—gov-
ernmental or private—to acquire their private information. I cover
each.of these possibilities in turn, concluding that only the last is likely
to provide much solace for privacy advocates in the near future.
242 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Collateral Damage, N.Y. Tutus, Feb. 22, 2004, § 7, at 10 (re-
viewing eight new books dedicated to the 'subject of privacy in contemporary America).
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A. Moving Beyond Assumption of Risk
As discussed above, what I describe as the current crisis in Ameri-
can privacy law dates from the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz
v. United States. 243 At the time it was decided, Katz was rightly seen as a
privacy boon, another Warren Court decision extending individual
rights. 244 Katz overturned Olmstead v. United States, announced that pri-
vacy was an individual, portable right, and extended Fourth Amend-
ment protections to areas and activities to which they had never pre-
viously applied. 245 Over time, however, the shifting meaning of the
Fourth Amendment that was adopted in Katz has come to be seen as a
threat as well as a benefit to civil liberties. 246
No clear alternative to Katz's conception of the Fourth Amend-
ment has yet emerged, however. Although proposed alternative con-
ceptions of privacy rights have ranged from a return to a textually-
based interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 247 to the passage of a
constitutional amendment explicitly establishing a right to privacy, 248
to the creation of a federal agency to monitor privacy, 249 to an appeal
to Lochner-era formalist interpretation,250 no consensus has yet devel-
245 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
244 See, e.g., Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court 1969 Term—Foreword: Waiver of Constitu-
tional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 H ARV. L. Rev. I, 12-13 (1970) (praising the Court for
moving from a Fourth Amendment based on property rights to one in which It] he em-
phasis is placed on the will of the actor").
245 See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
247 See. e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92-94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (ar-
guing for a return to a reading of the Fourth Amendment based on the text of the
Amendment as it would have been understood by the Founders).
245 See, e.g., Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8
HAuv. J.L. & TEcti. 75, 77 (1994) (attributing a call for such an amendment to Harvard
Law Professor Laurence H. Tribe).
245 See, e.g., Robert M. Gellman, Fragmented, Incomplete, and Discontinuous: The Failure of
Federal Privacy Regulatory Proposals and Institutions, 6 SOVIIVARE L.J. 199, 236 (1993). Robert
M. Gellman provided the following explanation:
Of the four major privacy studies identified in the last twenty years, three rec-
ommend the establishment of a permanent new federal agency with respon-
sibilities including privacy policy. The fourth study, the earliest of the four, re-
jected the notion of a privacy regulatory agency. although it did recommend
institutional change within one cabinet department to implement and over-
see recommended new privacy policies.
Id.
25° Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy. Property, and
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 561 (1996) (arguing that although
"Mach of the Lochner era approaches has defects," they "can be integrated into a vibrant
and effective theory of the Fourth Amendment").
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.oiled regarding how to improve on the Katz formulation. Thus, Katz is
apparently here to stay, seemingly unloved by conservatives and liber-
als alike, but not so intolerable to either group that a consensus for
replacing it has emerged. Perhaps part of the doctrine's current ap-
peal is its malleability—it means whatever a majority of the Court
thinks it means. Although the doctrine has been criticized precisely
because of its imprecision, as long as both sides are able to utilize the
doctrine equally to gain a majority of the Court's votes, they are
equally unwilling to pursue its fundamental change.
Although the Court is thus unlikely to distance itself from the
Katz formulation any time soon, it does not follow that its Fourth
Amendment doctrine is entirely irredeemable. For example, the doc-
trine established in Smith v. Marytand2" and United States v. Millet252
that the exposure of information to anyone, even for a limited pur-
pose, releases any expectation of privacy in that information, could be
overturned without requiring an unlikely overhaul of the Court's en-
tire Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. In place of this assumption-of-
risk view of privacy, 255 the Court should adopt the reasoning it has
employed elsewhere that societal expectations of privacy ought to be
validated rather than ignored. As discussed above, in Minnesota v. Ol-
son, the Court held that an overnight guest had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the home he was visiting and thus could object to
evidence illegally seized from that home.254 The Court reasoned that
although the guest surrendered some of his privacy to his host, guests
generally expect their hosts to honor their privacy. 255 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court described its holding as "merely recogniz[ing]
the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share."255
Had the Court applied these "everyday expectations of privacy"
to the Miller and Smith cases, the result would likely have been very
different. For example, the COurt might reasonably conclude from
the fact that nearly all people with the means to do so keep their
money in bank accounts that they reasonably expect their privacy in
their banking information to be respected. Just as the overnight guest
251 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
252 425 U.S. 435, 436 (1976).
2" See, e.g., Skok, supra note 209, at 61 (noting that Iciourts employing assumption of
risk analysis focus on the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Miller and Smith v.
Maiylatr) (citations omitted).
255
 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990).
255 Id.
256 Id. at 98.
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is aware of a risk that his host will betray him, yet nonetheless enjoys a
reasonable expectation of privacy in another's home, so the bank pa-
tron, aware of the (relatively minute) risk of betrayal, ought to be en-
titled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his financial records.
In his dissent in California v. Greenwood, Justice William Brennan
made essentially this point, arguing the following:
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open
and rummage through the containers does not negate the
expectation of privacy in their contents any more than the
possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of privacy in
the home; or the possibility of a private intrusion negates an
expectation of privacy in an unopened package; or the pos-
sibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conver-
sation negates an expectation of privacy in the words spoken
on the telephone.257
Justice Brennan rightly saw the assumption-of-risk argument as some-
thing of a reductio ad absurdum. If we accept the premise that the pos-
sibility of a private intrusion negates a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, then, because private intrusion is almost always possible, nothing
can ever be private.
In determining whether or not an expectation is in fact one that
society is willing to validate, rather than one that is merely possible,
the Court ought to be guided by more than its own intuitions regard-
ing societal expectations of privacy. 258 As discussed above, the ques-
tion of whether a particular area is widely perceived as private is an
empirical one, one that social scientists can answer, and to a certain
extent have answered. 259 Thus, calling on judges to consider societal
expectations truly is more than an invitation for them to turn their
personal views of privacy into law. By investigating current societal
norms—as expressed through survey research, public referenda, and
actual practices—judges can, as they did in Olson, both increase the
scope of rights and confirm Katz's promise that those expectations of
287 486 U.S. 35, 54 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
258 Of course, this is exactly what many conservatives have accused the Court of doing
in its post-Katz jurisprudence. See, e.g., Carter, 525 U.S. at 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(opining that the only thing the past three decades have established about the Katz test
... is that, unsurprisingly, those 'actual (subjective) expectationisl of privacy' 'that society
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable"' bear an uncanny resemblance to those expecta-
tions of privacy that this Court considers reasonable") (citations omitted).
299
	 generally Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 80 (reporting the results of a survey
regarding the perceived invasions of a number of common searches).
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privacy that society is willing to validate as reasonable will be pro-
tected in the face of expanding government surveillance.
Of course, the assumption-of-risk theory of reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy has not been limited to the Smith and Miller cases.
Those two cases are merely ad extension of the doctrine the Court
announced in a number of other cases—Ciraolo, Dunn, Greenwood, and
even Katz itself—that the police need not avert their eyes from what a
person exposes or allows to be exposed to others. 260
 It is a broad jump
from this premise, however, to the finding that society is willing to ac-
cept police officers peering down from the skies, trespassing onto pri-
vate property; rummaging through trash, or peering into homes with
advanced imagers. The assertion that the mere possibility of such in-
trusion destroys an expectation of privacy follows from neither the
text nor the principle of Katz.
B. Increased Privacy Protection.
The second possible solution to the current conundrum of pri-
vacy law in the United States is affording greater protections to indi-
viduals from private invasions of privacy. If trespass laws are further
expanded to cover invasions of privacy as well as physical invasions, if
employees are able to contract for greater protection from surveil-
lance by their employers, if websites offer enforceable protection for
the information revealed by their users, then the bounds of private
conduct will be circumscribed and the scope of permissible govern-
ment conduct will likely contract as well.
The problem with the extension of civil privacy protections, how-
ever, is that the fit between the lawfulness of the conduct government
2e0
 In fact, what has been described as the assumption-of-risk theory has not been lim-
ited to this context. For example, in Hoffa v. United States, the Supreme Court held that no
search or seizure occurs when a federal agent poses as a confidant of a criminal defendant,
noting that "Inieither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the
Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966), In United
States v. White, the Supreme Court extended Hoffa to cover agents wearing hidden micro-
phones, finding the following:
If the conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic
equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expecta-
tions of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversa-
tions made by the agent or by others from transmissions received from the
agent to whom the defendant is talking and whose trustworthiness the defen-
dant necessarily risks.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971).
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agents are engaged in and whether or not the government is violating
a reasonable expectation of privacy is hardly perfect. As the cases dis-
cussed in Parts II and III make clear, the existence of a property right
or other civil protection is only one factor a court will consider in de-
termining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been in-
vaded.261 Thus, even if privacy protections continue to be extended—
offering individuals  greater protection against their employers,
neighbors, insurers, and the like—this extension may prove to be of
little use against government actors who violate these provisions. 262
For example, in Greenwood, the defendant argued that the search
of his garbage that led to his conviction was illegal under California
law and that this fact ought to insulate him against the evidence ob-
tained against him. 263 The Court dismissed this assertion quickly, even
though the provision to which Greenwood referred was contained in
his state's constitution:
We have never intimated .. that whether or not a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
depends on the law of the particular State in which the
search occurs. We have emphasized instead that the Fourth
Amendment analysis must turn on such factors as "our socie-
tal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scru-
pulous protection from government invasion." We have al-
ready concluded that society as a whole possesses no such
understanding with regard to garbage left for collection at
the side of a public street. Respondent's argument is no less
than a suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of
each State are to determine the reach of the Fourth
Amendment. We do not accept this submission. 264
The Court was, of course, correct that the state governments asser-
tions of the privacy expectations of their citizens are incapable of
binding the federal courts. Such local determinations, however, at the
very least, ought to be relevant to a federal court's determination of
whether a particular individual enjoyed a reasonable expectation of
261 See supra notes 174-188,199-210, and 218-241 and accompanying text.
262 I say nothing here of those instances in which a private individual has violated one
of these provisions and turns incriminating evidence over to the government. Under cur-
rent doctrine this evidence simply need not be excluded as there is no government con-
duct violative of the Fourth Amendment.
263 486 U.S. at 43.
264 Id. at 93-44 (citations omitted).
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privacy. Although the Supremacy Clause prohibits the states from dic-
tating the bounds of federal law, nothing would prohibit a federal
court from considering the fact that a state has protected the defen-
dant against exactly the sort of privacy invasion engaged in by gov-
ernment agents in a given case.
In addition to the misfit between the legality of a search and the
determination that the search infringes on the defendant's reason-
able expectation of privacy, there is the additional concern that the
existence of privacy protection in tort or contract will cause members
of the public to become more lackadaisical in protecting their privacy.
It would likely have come as a surprise to Ronald Dunn, for example,
that federal officers could enter his property to look for drugs not-
withstanding the no trespassing" signs and fences that he con-
structed on that property. 265
 In fact, we can be fairly certain that lie
would not have manufactured drugs in the way he did had he been
aware of this fact. The protections that Dunn was afforded against his
neighbors—the opportunity to sue them in trespass or to seek a
criminal conviction against them should they enter his property with-
out his permission—were thus worse than useless when it came to
protecting him against governmental incursions, It is likely that if
Dunn had not been lulled into a sense of security by the trespass laws
of his jurisdiction, he either would have put up more and better
fences or chosen to manufacture his drugs elsewhere.
Furthermore, the case law makes quite clear that the only way in
which privacy statutes can effectively protect individuals from the use
of their private information against them in criminal prosecutions is if
the statutes explicitly prescribe exclusion as a remedy.266 The courts
have decided in a variety of contexts that the failure of legislatures to
provide for exclusion as a remedy is an indication that they wished to
make civil remedies exclusive. 267 Unless legislatures become willing to
explicitly provide for exclusion—to state that evidence seized in a
manner that would violate the statute if obtained by a private party
265 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S: 294, 305 (1987).
266 See, e.g., United States v Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1111 (D. Kan. 2000)
(finding that there was no need to decide if the [Cable Communication Policy Act] was
violated in the instant action because even if it were, defendant still would not be entitled
to suppression of the evidence as a remedy for the violation. As with the ECPA, the CCPA
speaks nothing of an exclusionary remedy, only a civil remedy."); United States v. Ham-
brick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999) (finding that "[d]espite its concern for pri-
vacy, Congress did not provide for suppression where a party obtains stored data or trans-
actional records in violation of the [Electronic Communications Privacy] Act").
267 See Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 1111; Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
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may not be admitted in court—the passage of additional privacy pro-
visions is unlikely to prevent the use in criminal proceedings of evi-
dence seized in violation of these statutes.
My point is not that we are better off without trespass laws, with-
out workplace protections, or without medical privacy rules; these
rules can significantly increase our privacy, at least with regard to one
another. And it is quite possible that increased privacy with regard to
private actors may convince some courts that privacy protections
against the government ought to be validated as well. Rather, my
point is that these protections, alone, are unlikely to be sufficient to
protect us from invasions by our government and may, in fact, make
us more vulnerable to these invasions. As I argue in the next section, I
believe that the only method for reliably achieving privacy from gov-
ernmental intrusions is to take practical steps to make invasions of
privacy by actors, public or private, as difficult as possible.
C. Taking Practical Steps
We come, finally, to what. I argue is the most effective way to in-
crease the protections we have against government surveillance. Indi-
viduals must take actual, practical steps to protect their information
from all prying eyes, public and private. For example, Danny Kyllo's
indoor marijuana cultivation was detected because lie did not take
sufficient steps to keep it from being discovered. 268 The facts of the
case seem to indicate that the use of additional insulation could have
made the heat produced by his grow lamps undetectable from outside
his home.209 Although the Court held that a presumptively invalid
search occurred when the thermal imager was used in his case, future
cases are unlikely to be resolved in a similar manner.
What is required is not for the public to become technophiles, to
engage in a privacy arms race against government. 270 Rather, many of
the steps that individuals can take to protect themselves from private
snooping and from government searches are relatively straightfor-
ward. For example, inexpensive shredders make the reading of pri-
vate correspondence, the obtaining of financial information, or the
268 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
269 See id.
270 In fact, such an arms race might be very much against the public's interest. The
goal is not to make discovery of information by the government impossible. Such a goal
would be both unwise and largely unattainable. Rather, the goal is to make discovery of
information by private citizens more difficult and thus to further guarantee the protection
of that information vis-a-vis the government.
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perusing of medical records impossible, even when those records are
tossed into the common trash. In this sense, a twenty-five dollar device
may be much more protective of privacy than a statute imposing civil
or criminal penalties for those, looking through disposed trash. Simi-
larly, basic encryption software, available from any number of for-
profit and not-for-profit purveyors, can do the work that the EPCA
and the Wiretap Act simply cannot. 271 Because these techniques can
make e-mail, web traffic, instant messaging, and the like almost im-
possible for a busy-body or snoop to read, 272 they significantly reduce
the likelihood that a court will find that a defendant has abandoned a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that conduct. 273 Even under the
current assumption-of-risk reading of the Fourth Amendment, an in-
dividual who has made his e-mail unreadable by anyone except its in-
tended recipient cannot reasonably be found to have waived a privacy
interest in that information.
Clearly, asking individuals to take personal, practical steps to pro-
tect their privacy is no panacea. For example, it is virtually impossible
to live in the modern era without sharing information with others.
Although it may once have been possible to do without banks, without
credit cards, and without leaving electronic footprints that could be
retraced, that era has long since passed. Thus, the goal is to make
people aware of the informatiOn they send into the world, to alert
them to the nefarious uses to which that information can be put—not
only by private actors but by the gov.ernment as well—and to encour-
age them to minimize their exposure where they can.
There is no doubt that advocating vigilance against one's neigh-
bors is a defeatist view of privacy today. Unfortunately, I believe that
any other view of the current state of privacy law in the United States
271 See, e.g, ELEC, PRIVACY !Nil). Cm., EPIC ONLINE GUIDE '1'0 PRIVACY RESOURCES, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/privacy_resources_faci.litml
 (last updated May 6, 2002) (list-
ing some of the array of products available to make online life more private).
272 See, e.g., Max Guirguis, Electronic Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy, 81 Tucti. L. & Pot.'v 135, 154 (2003) (explaining that "strong encryption makes e-
mail practically impossible to decrypt and virtually pointless to intercept").
273
 Privacy groups generally recommend such practical steps as well. See, e.g., Et.r.c.
PRIVACY INFo. Cm., What You Can Do to Avoid Profiling: Engage in Privacy Self Defense, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/#selfdefense (last updated Oct. 13, 2004) (suggest-
ing that lw]herever possible, minimize the amount of personal data given to commercial
or government entities. Do not release contact information where it is unnecessary....
Read privacy policies."); fiEnt:rn PRIVACY PROJECT, WIIAT YOU CAN Do TO PROTECT YOUR
PRIVACY (2002) (encouraging members to read privacy policies and to closely guard those
to whom they give their private data), available at lutp://www.healthprivacy.org/usr_doc/
Checklist.pdf (last updated Oct. 22, 2002).
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is simply unrealistic. 274 Until elected officials are willing to take up the
cause of expanding protections against government, however, self-
defense is the only course that remains available.
CONCLUSION
At the outset I described the Bush administration's now-abandoned
plans for the formation of a Total Information Awareness program.275
This plan set off alarm bells as civil libertarians on both the right 276 and
the left277 expressed concern that the agency, which would combine in-
formation from both governmental and private sources into an Über-
database, would signal the death of privacy in the United States. 278 As a
result of this outcry, the agency has been abandoned and its mission has
been scaled back.
The linkage between information gleaned by private sources and
information gleaned by government sources, however, has already
been made and will continue to exist regardless of the future of Total
274 In fact, my view of the state of privacy in the United States today is considerably less
pessimistic than the views of others. See, e.g., supra notes 172, 190 and accompanying text
(describing works authored by Jeffrey L. Seglin and John Markoff, respectively).
275 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
273 See, e.g., William Safire, Privacy Invasion Curtailed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A41.
William Safire argues the following:
In the name of combating terrorism, 'TIN would scoop up your lifetime
paper trail—bank records, medical files, credit card purchases, academic rec-
ords, etc.—and marry them to every nosy neighbor's gossip to the FBI about
you. [I have described] [t]he combination of intrusive commercial 'data min-
ing' and new law enforcement tapping into the private lives of innocent
Americans ... as a supersnoop's dream.
Id. Similarly, Gene Healy argues the following:
Some have suggested that [proposed TIA Director Adm. John] Poindex-
ter's record as a former Iran-Contra defendant convicted of five felony counts
of lying to Congress disqualify him from his position. But the question isn't
whether Poindexter's the right man for the job; it's whether that job should
exist in the first place.
Gene Healy, Cato Inst., Beware of Total Information Awareness, DAILY COMMENT., at http://
www.cato.org/dailys/O1-20-03.html ( Jan. 20, 2003).
277 See, e.g., Jay Stanley, 11 the Threat from "Total Information Awareness" Overblown?, at
hop://www.aclu.org/privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=11501&c=130  (Dec. 18, 2002) (arguing that
"a close examination of existing public material on TIA makes several other points clear:
the goal is to collect information about everyone, not just specific targets; privacy protec-
tions promised by Pentagon officials cannot be relied upon; and existing legal protections
for privacy cannot be relied upon").
278 See, e.g., Solove, supra note 203, at 1084 (decrying the flow of information from pri-
vate to public information collectors).
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Information Awareness. Because courts have been instructed to look
to private conduct when determining the permissible bounds of
official conduct, the link between private invasions of privacy and
government intrusion already exists, and it exists in a manner that is
in many ways more insidious than the defunct Orwellian agency.
